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INTRODUCTION
How much deference should courts afford the executive’s interpretations of statutes and treaties in foreign relations law? This question
that has long engaged foreign relations scholars has found new salience
in recent years, as the courts have been called repeatedly to determine
the meaning of statutes and treaties bearing on the President’s detention and trial powers in combating international terrorism. Among
courts noting the confusion on this issue are those now attempting to
address whether and to what extent the executive’s views are relevant in
interpreting the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), the
statute the President invokes to justify continued detention of terrorist
1
suspects at the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay. While the Su2
preme Court has offered some guidance on the scope of the statute,
the AUMF itself is silent on the question of detention. As the courts
have struggled to choose between two interpretations of the statute—
one put forward by the executive, the other advanced by detainees—
courts have been notably equivocal on the potentially dispositive issue
of judicial deference: “The Court does not accept the government’s
position [on the meaning of the statute] in full, then, even given the
deference accorded to the Executive in this realm, because it is ulti3
mately the province of the courts to say ‘what the law is’ . . . .”
1

Authorization for Use of Military Force, 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note (2006).
See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 516-19 (2004) (plurality opinion) (finding
that the AUMF permits detention, at a minimum, of individuals who were “‘part of or
supporting forces hostile to the United States or coalition partners’ in Afghanistan and
who ‘engaged in an armed conflict against the United States’” there (quoting Brief for
Respondent at 3, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (No. 03-6696))).
3
Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63, 69 (D.D.C. 2009) (quoting Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)); see also id. (“Although there is some disagreement regarding the extent of the deference owed the Executive in this setting, it
is beyond question that some deference is required.”). The court also cites articles reflecting the scholarly debate over deference:
2

Compare Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law,
116 YALE L.J. 1170, 1220 (2007) (arguing that with respect to the AUMF, “the
President should be taken to have the authority to interpret ambiguities as he
chooses”), with Derek Jinks & Neal Katyal, Disregarding Foreign Relations Law, 116
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Historically, most scholars have accepted with little question the
notion that the Court will defer to executive views in core matters of
foreign relations, particularly where matters of national security are
4
concerned. Yet on descriptive and normative grounds, the events of
the past decade have called the prevailing account into question. In
treaty interpretation, the Court has invoked a Marbury-based insistence on asserting its own formal interpretive authority. As the Court
put it perhaps most dramatically in recent opinions construing the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: “If treaties are to be given
effect as federal law under our legal system, determining their meaning
as a matter of federal law ‘is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department,’ headed by the ‘one supreme Court’ established by
5
the Constitution.” Likewise, in a series of decisions involving national
security, the Court has been anything but deferential to the executive’s
6
interpretation of the relevant statute or treaty. In Rasul v. Bush, Hamdi
7
8
9
v. Rumsfeld, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, and Boumediene v. Bush, the Court has
swept aside vigorous arguments by the executive that it refrain from engagement on abstention or political question grounds. Moreover, the
Court has scarcely noted any doctrinal tradition of interpretive “defeYALE L.J. 1230, 1234 (2007) (acknowledging that under existing doctrines deference is warranted in some circumstances, but arguing that “increased judicial
deference to the executive in the foreign relations domain is inappropriate”).
Id. at 69.
4
See, e.g., Department of Justice Oversight: Preserving Our Freedoms While Defending
Against Terrorism: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 162 (2002)
(statement of Laurence H. Tribe, Tyler Professor of Constitutional Law, Harvard Law
School) (“[C]ourts necessarily see but one case at a time and in wartime tend to defer
to the executive’s greater knowledge and expertise . . . .”); LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 132 (2d ed. 1996) (“[F]oreign affairs
make a difference. Here, the courts are less willing than elsewhere to curb the federal
political branches, are even more disposed to presume the constitutional validity of
their actions and to accept their interpretations of statutes, and have even developed
doctrines of special deference to them.”); Christina E. Wells, Questioning Deference, 69
MO. L. REV. 903, 906 & n.14 (2004) (citing various sources).
5
Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 353-54 (2006) (quoting Marbury, 5 U.S.
(1 Cranch) at 177); see also Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 523 (2008) (rejecting the executive’s argument that a judgment of the International Court of Justice, although not
binding in courts of its own authority, “became the law of the land with precisely that effect pursuant to the President’s Memorandum and his power ‘to establish binding rules
of decision that preempt contrary state law’” (quoting Brief for United States as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 5, Medellín, 552 U.S. 491 (2008) (No. 06-0984))).
6
542 U.S. 466 (2004) (interpreting the federal habeas statute).
7
542 U.S. 507 (2004) (interpreting the AUMF and the Geneva Conventions).
8
548 U.S. 557 (2006) (interpreting the Detainee Treatment Act, the Uniform
Code of Military Justice, and the Geneva Conventions).
9
553 U.S. 723 (2008) (interpreting the Military Commissions Act).
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rence” on the meaning of the laws. While descriptive claims that the
Court invariably defers to the President in foreign relations law interpretation have always been subject to challenge, the Court’s recent be10
havior has made this account increasingly untenable.
In the wake of such decisions, scholars have turned renewed attention to the task of identifying a doctrine of “deference” in foreign
relations law. Cass Sunstein and Eric Posner, among others, have expressed the normative concern that the Court, unduly interested in
“saying what the law is” in an area of questionable judicial competence, was no longer taking sufficient account of the executive’s supe11
rior expertise and political responsiveness in this realm.
Others,
while not necessarily lamenting the less deferential judicial role, have
focused on the importance of finding some constraining approach
12
that would provide interpretive guidance to the courts. If there is no
predictable or sensible way of determining how much attention the
Court will pay executive views in construing foreign relations law, ruleof-law interests require, at a minimum, the development of a new understanding of the judicial relationship to the executive on questions
of law interpretation. Responding to such concerns, Sunstein and
Posner thus joined Curtis Bradley and others in suggesting that courts
should defer to the executive in cases with “substantial foreign relations
implications,” just as they do under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Re13
14
sources Defense Council, Inc. in the standard administrative law context.
But as this Article contends, Chevron’s promise of resolving the deference question in foreign relations law is almost certainly overstated.
10

See infra Part I.
See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 3 (arguing that reasonable interpretations by
the executive of ambiguous statutes should “trump” certain judicial doctrines); Cass R.
Sunstein, Administrative Law Goes to War, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2663 (2005) [hereinafter
Sunstein, Administrative Law Goes to War] (arguing that presidential action under statutes authorizing the use of military force should receive considerable deference); Cass
R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive’s Power to Say What the Law Is, 115 YALE L.J.
2580 (2006) [hereinafter Sunstein, Beyond Marbury] (expressing approval of judicial
deference to executive interpretations). But see Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference
and Foreign Affairs, 86 VA. L. REV. 649, 701 (2000) (noting the “substantial deference”
courts give the executive branch in matters of foreign affairs).
12
See Robert M. Chesney, Disaggregating Deference: The Judicial Power and Executive
Treaty Interpretations, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1723, 1772-73 (2007) (proposing a model of deference to executive treaty interpretation that varies based on the circumstances); Jinks
& Katyal, supra note 3, at 1236-38 (recognizing that while some judicial deference is
often appropriate, it is not appropriate when international law seeks to constrain the
executive itself).
13
467 U.S. 837 (1984).
14
Posner & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 1217.
11
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First, Chevron is not nearly as doctrinally stable as its advocates suggest.
As a growing set of empirical studies has shown, Chevron has exerted
anything but a defining hold on Supreme Court treatment of agency
interpretation of federal laws. This Article will describe how the contemporary Court has regularly avoided applying traditional Chevron deference in what might otherwise have been thought to be circumstances
described by the core of that doctrine. Indeed, the Court has ignored
Chevron as a useful interpretive guide in recent foreign relations cases in
15
which it might most readily be implicated. At the same time, while
one of the most important functional rationales for embracing Chevron
in the foreign relations context is said to be the doctrine’s ability to take
account of the executive’s superior expertise, Chevron is, in key respects,
a blunt tool for ensuring that expertise is taken into account in law interpretation. An agency administrator in principle enjoys deference
under Chevron whether or not the administrator has actually included
the relevant agency experts in the analysis. If one accepts the view that
the executive’s key strength is its expertise on certain questions arising
in foreign relations, one would presumably wish to insist that the actual
experts inside the executive branch be consulted. If expertise matters,
there may be more effective ways of ensuring its inclusion than review
for generalized “reasonableness” of “executive” interpretation.
Beyond this, the wholesale importation of Chevron into foreign relations law poses another problem. As Chevron’s critics have emphasized since soon after the decision came down, Chevron appears to be
in tension with the Court’s formal constitutional power under Article
16
III, which has at its core the duty to “say what the law is.” When the
Court does something less than determine for itself what the law is,
the argument goes, it is ceding power that the Framers of the Consti17
tution intended to reserve to the Article III courts. While administrative law scholars have grappled with this problem for decades, it has
been surprisingly absent from the contemporary foreign relations law
debate. Yet importing Chevron into the foreign relations setting without attempting to address the issue only perpetuates the formal dilemma. Particularly because the formal allocation of foreign relations
power between the judicial and executive branches—unlike the rather
more novel authority of administrative agencies—is an express subject
15

See infra subsection I.B.2.
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
17
See, e.g., Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the
Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 525 (1989) (arguing that Chevron poses a
challenge to the separation of powers).
16
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of constitutional concern, it seems essential to have some formal
theory of how interpretive power may be shared in this realm before
designing a deference doctrine that effectively shares it. At what point
does a pretermission of the judicial interpretive inquiry—in favor of the
executive’s meaning—chip away at a formal authority the Constitution
otherwise grants to the courts? Once a “case or controversy” is properly
before an Article III court, is there a formal floor of judicial power to
interpret statutes and treaties, beneath which no functional deference
rationale can justify allowing the court to sink? Without some more developed understanding of what is meant by the “judicial power” in foreign relations law, it is premature to settle on a deference regime that
may have the court adjusting its approach to law interpretation. This
Article begins exploring answers to these questions of formal power.
Part I engages the current debate over judicial deference in foreign
relations interpretation. While embracing the need for greater clarity,
it argues that importing Chevron into foreign relations law is an unsatisfying solution. Part II then takes up the problem of formal judicial
power in detail, considering first the two leading accounts of the “judicial power” in statutory interpretation. The first model, still perhaps
the dominant understanding of the courts’ role in statutory interpretation, known as “faithful agent” theory, sees the relationship between
Congress and the courts as that of principal and agent, where the judicial agent’s duty is limited to attempting to discern and accurately apply
18
the directions of the legislative principal set forth in statute. Yet as will
be discussed, faithful agent theory seems unlikely to fully explain the
judicial role in foreign relations law. In statutory interpretation, it is not
immediately clear that it leaves room for an executive interpretive role
of any sort. For treaty interpretation, faithful agent theory’s utility is
even more suspect. Treaties, of course, are not concluded by the legislature alone, but are “ma[d]e” by the executive, “by and with the advice
19
and consent of the Senate.” Indeed, the U.S. executive and Senate are
not the sole lawmakers involved in making treaties; foreign treaty part20
ners help conceive, negotiate, and draft the legal text. In this context,

18

See infra Section II.A.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
20
See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 (providing that treaties should be interpreted by looking to the actions
and pertinent agreements made by all the parties of the treaty); Sumitomo Shoji Am.,
Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 183-85 (1982) (attending to the views of both the United States and Japan in interpreting the terms of a Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Treaty between the parties).
19
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it seems problematic at best to view the U.S. executive as the sole “principal” lawmaker whose intent the Court must discern.
A second model of the judicial power, commonly called “instrumental theory,” is somewhat more promising. It holds that Article III
courts were created not to be mere agents of Congress, but rather to
employ quintessentially judicial canons of interpretation and methods
of legal reasoning that will both help to clarify ambiguous texts and
21
influence legislative drafting over time.
Yet while instrumental
theory adds much value to the question of judicial power in foreign
relations law, it too leaves central questions about the relationship between the interpretive power of the courts and the executive unanswered. Instrumental theory’s relative silence on the role of normative
22
canons of statutory construction —for example, an avoidance canon
that requires a clear statement before rendering an interpretation that
has the effect of delegating power from one branch to another—
leaves unsettled one of the central questions in foreign relations law:
23
whether interpretive canons of constitutional stature still apply.
Likewise, it seems hard to believe that the judicial power in treaty interpretation hinges on the expectation that interpretive practices pursued by the U.S. judiciary alone are meant to have a clear impact on
treaty drafting over time. While the U.S. executive certainly has some
incentive to take Supreme Court interpretive expectations into account in negotiating treaty texts, the United States’ system is but one
judicial system among many in multilateral treaty interpretation. Foreign courts are hardly bound by the interpretive guidance of the U.S.
high court, and our treaty partners may have their own domestic interpretive demands to fulfill. Under the circumstances, it would seem

21

See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 11618 (1994) (discussing the belief of the Framers of the Constitution in judicial engagement in interpretation); Jonathan T. Molot, The Judicial Perspective in the Administrative
State: Reconciling Modern Doctrines of Deference with the Judiciary’s Structural Role, 53 STAN.
L. REV. 1, 7 (2000) (arguing that judicial influence over legislative behavior is “an important component of the Founders’ constitutional design”).
22
A number of scholars have discussed the role of so-called normative canons in statutory interpretation. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, QuasiConstitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593,
598 (1992) (“A good many of the substantive canons of statutory construction are directly
inspired by the Constitution . . . .”); Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2111 (1990) (“By using these principles, courts decide
cases of statutory meaning by reference to something external to legislative desires . . . .”).
23
See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War
on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2103-06 (2005) (arguing against a clear statement
requirement on delegation grounds in interpreting the AUMF).
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surprising if instrumental influence of this sort were the sole, or even
primary, expected judicial function in treaty interpretation.
Given these deficiencies, this Article turns in Part III to offer a
separate, supplemental understanding of the judicial power in foreign
relations law. Here called equilibrium theory, the model this Article
explores draws on historic justifications for judicial supremacy over
constitutional interpretation to propose that part of the judicial role in
statutory and treaty interpretation is to aid in maintaining a structural
24
balance of power. As Monaghan has noted, “Marshall’s grand conception of judicial autonomy in law declaration was not in terms or in
25
logic limited to constitutional interpretation.” And while the most
sweeping conceptions of judicial power to independently “say what
26
the law is” could not survive the modern administrative state, it is a
mistake to understand this transformation as the end of the Court’s
role in structural power balancing. The Framers’ vision of separated
branches, as post-Chevron critics have suggested, was of a government
of shared authority, each branch with enough constitutional power
27
“‘to resist encroachments of the others.’” Serving the demands of
functional effectiveness by allowing one branch to accrue greater authority over time may be permissible as long as the other branches can
respond with equal and opposite constraining force of their own.
Delegation could be tolerated, but only because it was possible to
28
maintain an offsetting power through judicial review. In this view, to
the extent a doctrine of deference disables the courts from helping to
29
maintain that system of “dynamic equilibrium,” it impermissibly encroaches on the structural mandate of the judicial power.
Such an understanding of the judicial power contributes to our approach to deference in statutory and treaty interpretation in several
ways. First, there is nothing in equilibrium theory that would preclude
the consideration of an executive branch interpretation of a law, particularly insofar as the executive may enjoy functional advantages in expertise that might clarify legislative meaning, or insofar as the executive
24

See Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 33 (1983) (describing Marbury’s understanding of the “judicial power” over
interpretation).
25
Id. at 2.
26
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
27
Farina, supra note 17, at 496-97 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 349 (James
Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)).
28
See id. at 487 (explaining how judicial review can help check excessive delegations of power).
29
Id. at 497.
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has a relevant formal role (i.e., to “make” treaties). There would, however, be an expectation in statutory interpretation that the Court would
apply substantive interpretive canons geared toward limiting excessive
delegations of power and disfavor interpretations that disable any one
branch from continued participation in a deliberative dialogue. And
there would be a corresponding expectation in treaty interpretation—
an expectation that domestic judicial power would function, at least at
the interpretive margins, to push back against the tendency in international law and legal structures to aggrandize power for executives within
30
domestic legal systems. As a result, an equilibrium theory understanding of the limits of judicial deference has direct implications for the interpretation of statutes like the AUMF, a statute whose meaning is in31
formed by international law and so occupies the courts today.
Before proceeding, it may be helpful to say a word about what the
field “foreign relations law” is meant here to describe. The term itself
may be most commonly read to capture a set of cases involving disputes
or other engagements between the United States and other nations.
Cases involving treaty interpretation thus seem centrally implicated. At
the same time, most scholars in the field recognize that certain questions of statutory interpretation might also fall within the “foreign relations” rubric—particularly statutes implicating special functional
strengths of the executive branch and statutes seeming to implicate the
32
executive’s own formal constitutional role. Given both the potential
breadth and the uncertain stability of such a category, a deference doctrine intended for the (said) peculiar demands of foreign relations law
might easily become the exception that swallows the rule. Be that as it
may, it nonetheless seems worthwhile to consider whether it is possible
to identify a theory of judicial power that would help inform the Court’s
approach to executive views across this admittedly broad range of cases.
The justifications for this approach are multiple. First, the text of
Article III setting forth the formal judicial power itself does not distin30

See generally Kim Lane Scheppele, The International State of Emergency: Challenges to Constitutionalism after September 11 at 3-5 (Sept. 21, 2006) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author) (describing how national executives have used a series of U.N. Security Council antiterrorism resolutions to evade structural constitutional constraints domestically).
31
See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518-19 (2004) (plurality opinion) (interpreting the AUMF to authorize the detention of certain individuals as enemy combatants).
32
See, e.g., Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 23, at 2100 (noting that the AUMF governs a context in which the President “possesses independent constitutional authority
under Article II,” so “the authorization need not be as precise as would be required in
the absence of concurrent presidential authority”).
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guish between statutes and treaties: “The judicial Power shall extend
to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the
33
Laws of the United States, and Treaties made . . . .” That is, the same
judicial power appears to extend to any of the subject instruments. It
may be the case that formal power granted to the executive (in foreign relations but not elsewhere) has some effect on what deference
the courts owe, and this Article will consider arguments supporting
this possibility. But because in the first instance the inquiry here is
about the scope of the judicial power since Marbury, it seems necessary
to begin by asking about the judicial power in general.
Second, however unstable the category of “foreign relations law”
may be, it is a field that both courts and scholars have long recognized
as having some exceptional salience in informing how the Court
should behave. By embracing the full breadth of the category—
including its extension to both statutes and treaties—we might better
understand how exceptional the category really is. If foreign relations
law is indeed increasingly indistinguishable from ordinary domestic
law—either in its formal attributes (e.g., texts, history, and decisional
law) or in the functional skills its application demands (e.g., expertise
and political accountability)—that is all the more reason to ensure
that any doctrine of “deference” in the field flows from some common
understanding of the judicial role.
I. THE PROBLEM OF INTERPRETATION IN FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
Scholars have long posited that the courts defer to executive
views in interpreting foreign relations law, particularly where matters
34
of national security are concerned. In statutory interpretation, the
Court has broadly construed legislative delegations of power to the
35
President. Deference is all the more evident in treaty interpretation, it is argued, where the President’s record of prevailing in the
36
Supreme Court is lengthy and where the President’s power to
33

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
See sources cited supra note 4 for examples of scholarly opinion describing deference to executive views.
35
See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 329 (1936)
(upholding a congressional delegation of authority to the President to impose an arms
embargo under certain circumstances).
36
See David J. Bederman, Deference or Deception: Treaty Rights as Political Questions, 70
U. COLO. L. REV. 1439, 1462-66 (1999) (arguing that judicial deference in treaty interpretation increased during the twentieth century); Bradley, supra note 11, at 659
(“Since early in the nation’s history, courts have been reluctant to contradict the executive branch in its conduct of foreign relations.”); Scott M. Sullivan, Rethinking Treaty
34
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“make treaties” may give the Court formal reasons to accede to the
37
President’s interpretive wishes. Counternarratives exist, to be sure,
but they have had seemingly modest effect in puncturing the prevail38
ing wisdom. Yet on descriptive and normative grounds, the Court’s
behavior in the past decade especially has called the prevailing account into question. This Part thus begins by highlighting some of
the Court’s recent decisions that have posed the greatest challenge
to historical expectations of deference in foreign relations law. It
then considers whether recent proposals to address the muddle of
deference doctrine in foreign relations law succeed in remedying
the problems their proponents hope to address.
A. Foreign Relations Deference in the Modern Court
The notion that the Court defers regularly to the executive’s views
in foreign relations law manifests itself somewhat differently in doctrines of treaty and statutory interpretation. In treaty interpretation,
the strongest argument that the Court defers to the executive’s reading comes from a small number of twentieth-century cases in which
the Court has noted that the “meaning given [treaties] by the departments of government particularly charged with their negotiation
39
To be clear, this “great
and enforcement is given great weight.”
Interpretation, 86 TEX. L. REV. 777, 780 (2008) (positing that twentieth-century courts
regularly deferred to executive actions in foreign affairs).
37
See sources cited supra note 36.
38
Recent historical analysis of the founding-era Court finds no tradition of judicial
deference to executive views on the meaning of treaties. See David Sloss, Judicial Deference to Executive Branch Treaty Interpretations: A Historical Perspective, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV.
AM. L. 497, 502-22 (2007) (surveying the Supreme Court’s historically nondeferential
approach to treaty interpretation). In statutory interpretation, scholars have long
worked to demonstrate that the political question doctrine, for example, has given the
Supreme Court little pause in practice. See THOMAS M. FRANCK, POLITICAL QUESTIONS/JUDICIAL ANSWERS 61 (1992) (arguing that the political question doctrine has
played a minimal role in Supreme Court case law and “may be falling into desuetude”).
39
Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 194 (1961); see also Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc.
v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 184-85 (1982) (“Although not conclusive, the meaning attributed to treaty provisions by the Government agencies charged with their negotiation and enforcement is entitled to great weight.” (citing Kolovrat, 366 U.S. at 194));
Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 295 (1933) (“[I]n resolving doubts the construction of a treaty by the political department of the government, while not conclusive upon courts called upon to construe it, is nevertheless of weight.”); Sullivan v.
Kidd, 254 U.S. 433, 442 (1921) (“[T]he construction placed upon the treaty before us
and consistently adhered to by the Executive Department of the Government, charged
with the supervision of our foreign relations, should be given much weight.”); Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447, 468 (1913) (“A construction of a treaty by the political department of the Government . . . is . . . of much weight.”).
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weight” language is invariably qualified immediately before or after by
insistence that the executive’s views are in no way “conclusive” on
40
questions of interpretation. Indeed, most treaty cases that find the
Court commenting at all about its interpretive methodology begin
with familiar textualist statements to the effect that “[i]n construing a
treaty, as in construing a statute, we first look to its terms to determine
41
its meaning.” A fair number of Supreme Court treaty cases say noth42
ing at all about notions of interpretive deference to the executive.
Nonetheless, Curtis Bradley, among others, has argued that such language “is not mere window dressing, but rather is a significant factor
43
in treaty interpretation.” And while raw outcome statistics tell us little about the role of deference doctrine as a dispositive factor in Supreme Court treaty interpretation, the executive has succeeded in
44
winning far more treaty interpretation cases than it has lost.
In statutory interpretation, strong notions of judicial deference to
the executive in foreign relations matters are traced most commonly
to United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., a non-wartime case in
which the Court embraced the President’s reading of a statute delegating authority to the executive to place an embargo on arms sales to
45
certain countries. Rejecting a nondelegation challenge to the President’s exercise of authority, the Court wrote sweepingly of “the very
delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole or46
gan of the federal government in the field of international relations,”
47
a “vast external realm” in which “the President alone has the power
48
to speak or listen as a representative of the nation.” Without making
clear the full consequences of this description for statutory interpretation, Curtiss-Wright has been understood to suggest that standard canons of interpretation (in particular, construing the text against instituting overly broad delegations of power) are less salient in matters of
40

See, e.g., Sumitomo, 457 U.S. at 184-85 (cautioning that agency interpretations are
“not conclusive”).
41
United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 663 (1992); see also Itel Containers Int’l Corp. v. Huddleston, 507 U.S. 60, 65 (1993) (“Our interpretation must begin,
as always, with the text of the Conventions.”).
42
See, e.g., Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644 (2004); Nielsen v. Johnson,
279 U.S. 47 (1929); In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453 (1891).
43
Bradley, supra note 11, at 701.
44
See Chesney, supra note 12, at 1752-58 (reviewing treaty deference cases and
concluding that the executive branch’s interpretation “prevails in most instances”).
45
299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).
46
Id.
47
Id. at 319.
48
Id.
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49

foreign relations. While Curtiss-Wright has been the subject of scath50
ing criticism over the years, it is broadly thought to contemplate exceedingly deferential attention to the President’s construction of sta51
tutory grants of authority.
Whether or not deference doctrines in treaty and statutory inter52
pretation have ever had much stability or influence, they have been
little in evidence in the Court’s interpretive methodology in recent
years. This Section highlights some of the more important opinions
in this regard, concluding that the Court has shown no inclination to
pretermit its own interpretive inquiry so that it might defer to an interpretation advanced by the executive. On the contrary, these cases
are most readily understood to embrace the vigorous assertion of the
Court’s own formal power of interpretation, including the wideranging consideration of functional arguments advanced by all sides.

49

See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 23, at 2100-01 (“‘[T]he same limitations on
delegation do not apply where the entity exercising the delegated authority itself possesses independent authority over the subject matter.’” (quoting Loving v. United
States, 517 U.S. 748, 772 (1996))).
50
See, e.g., Charles A. Lofgren, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation:
An Historical Reassessment, 83 YALE L.J. 1, 28-32 (1973) (criticizing the decision and its
resulting impact).
51
See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO.
L.J. 1083, 1098-1100 (2008) (describing a continuum of judicial deference regimes,
along which Curtiss-Wright-type attention to executive views appears at the most deferential end); see also Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 23, at 2101-02 (citing CurtissWright in support of broad readings of congressional delegations of power to the executive in foreign affairs).
52
Eskridge and Baer’s survey of 1014 Supreme Court cases since Chevron in which
an agency interpretation of a statute was at issue classifies only nine of these as foreign
affairs and national security matters receiving “super-strong deference”—cases in
which “the executive department interpretation prevails not only” when the statute is
ambiguous, “but also in cases where Congress has not clearly trumped the agency or
presidential construction.” Eskridge & Baer, supra note 51, at 1101-02 & n.56. But
even in these nine cases, it is debatable whether the executive’s position prevailed because the Court deferred to an executive interpretation of a statute rather than reaching that result based on its own independent analysis. For example, one of the nine
cases, Jama v. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 543 U.S. 335 (2005), announced no
deference scheme and conducted a thorough de novo exercise in statutory interpretation, noting only at the end that a “policy of deference” to the executive in foreign affairs would also lead it to favor the interpretation already given. Id. at 348. Another of
the nine, Cheney v. United States District Court, 542 U.S. 367 (2004), involved the interpretation of the common law writ of mandamus and common law executive privilege.
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1. Interpreting Treaties
Perhaps the most instructive set of cases from the modern Court
illuminating treaty interpretation has been the series addressing the
domestic effect of Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular
53
Relations, which requires authorities to inform a noncitizen arrestee
of her right to notify her home consulate of an arrest or pending
54
prosecution in U.S. courts. In Breard v. Greene, the Court held that
state procedural rules requiring defendants to raise treaty claims at
trial or waive those claims on appeal could prevent a defendant from
having the claim heard at all in a subsequent federal habeas proceed55
ing. But soon after the Breard decision came down, the International
Court of Justice (ICJ)—which an optional protocol to the Convention
named as having “compulsory jurisdiction” over “[d]ispute[s] arising
56
out of the interpretation or application of the Convention” —ruled
to the contrary. According to the ICJ, the application of a state procedural default rule to block habeas consideration of a defendant’s
treaty claim violated Article 36 of the Convention because it “had the
effect of preventing ‘full effect [from being] given to the purposes for
57
which the rights accorded under this article are intended.’”
The Supreme Court took up the effect of the ICJ ruling in two
subsequent opinions—both of which seem most distinguished for
their vigorous defense of the power of the Court itself. Sanchez-Llamas
v. Oregon involved the failure of the Virginia state police to notify Mr.
Sanchez-Llamas of his right to consular notification following his ar53

Vienna Convention on Consular Relations art. 36, done Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T.
77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261.
54
See, e.g., Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 504-06 (2008) (holding that Vienna Convention provisions are non-self-executing); Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 35860 (2006) (rejecting a claim that a judgment of the International Court of Justice requires overriding application of state procedural default rules); Breard v. Greene, 523
U.S. 371, 375-77 (1998) (determining that the Vienna Convention did not preclude application of state procedural default rules). The Vienna Convention provides that when
the police of a signatory nation arrest a foreign national, the detaining “authorities shall
inform” the foreign national “without delay” of his “right[]” to contact his nation’s consular officers. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, supra note 53, art. 36.
55
Breard, 523 U.S. at 375-76 (holding that state procedural rules can trump a defendant’s collateral assertion of Vienna Convention rights).
56
Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes art. 1, done
Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 325, 596 U.N.T.S. 488 (ratified by the United States in 1969).
57
LaGrand Case (Ger. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 498 (June 27) (quoting Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations, supra note 53, art. 36(2)); see also Avena and Other
Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12, 43 (Mar. 31) (finding a duty to give a
detainee notice of Article 36 rights once there is a strong reason to believe the person
is a foreign national).
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58

rest.
In rejecting Sanchez-Llamas’s argument that suppression of
evidence was a proper remedy for an Article 36 violation, the Court
59
made no mention of a canon of interpretive deference. On the contrary, to the extent the Court discussed its interpretive approach, it
was with simple reference to the Restatement version of treaty construction: “An international agreement is to be interpreted in good faith
in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to its terms in
60
their context and in the light of its object and purpose.” Likewise rejecting the suggestion that the Court must accept the ICJ’s decision as
61
authoritative on the treaty, the Court emphasized that it could not be
62
bound by the judgment of another judicial body. The Court’s reasoning on this point did not begin with any discussion of deference
(to the executive’s views or those of anyone else), but instead with a
ringing endorsement of the power of the independent judiciary: “If
treaties are to be given effect as federal law under our legal system, determining their meaning as a matter of federal law ‘is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department,’ headed by the ‘one su63
preme Court’ established by the Constitution.” Only after concluding, based on its own reading of the ICJ’s enabling statute, that
“[n]othing in the structure or purpose of the ICJ suggests that its interpretations were intended to be conclusive on our courts,” did the
Court note in its final paragraph that the interpretations of “‘the departments of government particularly charged with [treaties’] negotia64
tion and enforcement is given great weight.’” As it turned out, the
Court said, the executive agreed with its judgment that ICJ rulings are
65
not binding on U.S. courts.

58

548 U.S. at 340.
See id. at 345-50.
60
Id. at 346 (quoting 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES § 325(1) (1987)).
61
Id. at 353. Because the Court ruled against habeas petitioners on the remedy
question, it concluded it did not need to reach the third question presented in the
case: “whether Article 36 of the Vienna Convention grants rights that may be invoked
by individuals in a judicial proceeding.” Id. at 342-43.
62
Id. at 353-55.
63
Id. at 353-54 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803))
(citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 378-79 (2000) (opinion of Stevens, J.) (“At the
core of [the judicial] power is the federal courts’ independent responsibility—
independent from its coequal branches in the Federal Government, and independent
from the separate authority of the several States—to interpret federal law.”)).
64
Id. at 354-55 (quoting Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 194 (1961)).
65
Id. at 355.
59
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Yet even this passing notice of deference to the executive ultimately rang hollow. In 2005, the year before Sanchez-Llamas, President
Bush issued a memorandum opinion stating that the United States
would discharge its international obligations under the ICJ judgment by
“having State courts give effect to the [ICJ] decision in accordance with
general principles of comity in cases filed by the 51 Mexican nationals
66
addressed in that decision.” If the Sanchez-Llamas Court had been
principally interested in giving effect to the President’s desired outcome
in these cases, one might imagine it would have been at least possible to
construe the relevant texts to require that state courts give the decision
such an effect. Instead, the Court went to great lengths to restate the
executive’s more nuanced position on the Court’s own terms. While
the executive had “agreed to ‘discharge its international obligations’ in
having state courts give effect to the [ICJ’s] decision,” it did not express67
ly take the position that the ICJ’s interpretation binds U.S. courts.
68
In this light, the Court’s more recent decision in Medellín v. Texas
was of a piece with its equivocal response to the executive’s views.
Asked to determine whether the ICJ’s judgment itself gave petitioners
an enforceable right, the Court began with the same familiar, non69
While the Court
deferential statement of treaty interpretation.
agreed with the executive that the relevant treaties did not render ICJ
decisions directly enforceable in U.S. courts, it was only after the
Court thoroughly considered and rejected Medellín’s argument that it
mentioned that “the United States’ interpretation of a treaty ‘is en70
titled to great weight.’” Of greater significance, in rejecting the notion that the President’s 2005 memorandum telling state courts to
give effect to the ICJ decision required those courts to comply, the
Court dismissed the executive’s argument that the ICJ judgment “became the law of the land [binding on courts] pursuant to the Presi66

Memorandum from President George W. Bush for the Attorney General (Feb.
28, 2005), reprinted in Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents app. at 9a, Medellín v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660 (2004) (No. 04-5928).
67
Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 355 (quoting Memorandum from President George
W. Bush, supra note 66).
68
552 U.S. 491 (2008).
69
See id. at 506-07 (“The interpretation of a treaty, like the interpretation of a statute, begins with its text. Because a treaty ratified by the United States is ‘an agreement among sovereign powers,’ we have also considered as ‘aids to its interpretation’
the negotiation and drafting history of the treaty as well as ‘the postratification understanding’ of signatory nations.” (quoting Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 516 U.S.
217, 226 (1996) (citation omitted))).
70
Id. at 513 (quoting Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 185
(1982)).
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dent’s Memorandum and his power ‘to establish binding rules of deci71
sion that preempt contrary state law.’” Central to the executive’s position on this point was that the relevant treaties should be read to
“‘implicitly give the President’” the power to implement the United
States’ “treaty-based obligation” to effect compliance with the ICJ’s
72
decision. In essence, the executive was asking the Court to accept its
interpretation of the treaty—a reading that would allow it to maintain
that the treaty could not be enforced by courts upon the request of an
individual asserting a right, but could be (indeed must be) enforced
when the executive issued an informal instruction for court-based
compliance. This the Court refused to do, insisting that only Congress could convert “a non-self-executing treaty into a self-executing
73
one.” If the executive wanted to achieve this effect, it could have ensured that the treaty “contain[ed] language plainly providing for do74
As the Court had just concluded that the
mestic enforceability.”
treaty could not be read that way—as one might have thought a more
deferential analysis would require—the executive could not prevail.
The foregoing is hardly meant to argue that the executive’s understanding of treaties is irrelevant to judicial interpretation. On the
contrary, the Court clearly counts among its interpretive tools positions the executive has taken in negotiating treaties and in imple75
menting them. But drawing on executive views as probative of “legislative” intent (because it is reflective of the negotiating history) or as
evidence of post-ratification performance is notably different from attending to the executive’s views because of some functional interest in
the executive’s superior political accountability or expertise, as Che76
vron contemplates. Because they reflect executive behavior and not a
particular executive’s particular interpretive views, a treaty’s negotiating history and post-ratification practice may or may not turn out to
support the position of any given executive in any given case. In treaties, as in contracts, performance has been understood to be evidence
71

Id. at 523 (quoting Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 5, at 5).
72
Id. at 525 (quoting Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 5, at 11).
73
Id.
74
Id. at 526.
75
See supra note 39 (citing cases in which the Court considered executive negotiating history and performance).
76
See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865-66
(1984) (supporting the practice of judicial deference to executive agencies on grounds
of the executive’s electoral accountability and expertise).
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of the parties’ intent in creating the agreement; postcontract perfor77
mance can inform the meaning of an ambiguous clause. It is thus
the behavior of both parties to a treaty that the Court has found prob78
ative as a matter of interpretation. To the extent the Court attends
to the executive’s views, it regularly looks to the views of both negotiating partners as evidence of negotiating intent and of post-ratification
79
performance. As a unanimous Court put it:
Our role is limited to giving effect to the intent of theTreaty [sic] parties.
When the parties to a treaty both agree as to the meaning of a treaty
provision, and that interpretation follows from the clear treaty language,
we must, absent extraordinarily strong contrary evidence, defer to that
80
interpretation.

In this context, the Court’s lack of deference to the U.S. executive
since September 11, 2001, on the interpretation of the international
law of armed conflict (including the Geneva Conventions) should
perhaps have been less surprising than it seemed. Consider Hamdan
81
v. Rumsfeld, which presented the Court with a challenge to the legality of military-commission trials then underway at Guantanamo Bay.
Among other claims, Hamdan argued that the commission regime ran
afoul of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, treaties requiring, inter alia, that trials be held in a “‘regularly constituted court
affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indis82
pensable by civilized peoples.’” The Court promptly rejected the ex-

77

See Sullivan v. Kidd, 254 U.S. 433, 439 (1921) (stating that treaties should be interpreted in part by reference to principles of contract interpretation).
78
See Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 194-95 (1961) (“We have before us statements, in the form of diplomatic notes exchanged between the responsible agencies of
the United States and of Yugoslavia, to the effect that the 1881 Treaty, now and always,
has been construed as providing for inheritance by both countries’ nationals without
regard to the location of the property to be passed or the domiciles of the nationals.”).
79
Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176 (1982), is especially direct in
this regard. There, the Court reviewed evidence of both U.S. and Japanese intent to decide whether female employees’ Title VII discrimination claim against an American subsidiary of a Japanese company was effectively precluded by the terms of the Friendship,
Commerce and Navigation Treaty between the United States and Japan. See id. at 185-89.
80
Id. at 185 (emphasis added). Indeed, it was on this basis that Justice Scalia dissented in a later treaty interpretation case, arguing not that insufficient deference was
paid to the United States’ position but that “[w]hen we interpret a treaty, we accord
the judgments of our sister signatories ‘considerable weight.’” Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644, 658 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (quoting Air
France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 404 (1985)).
81
548 U.S. 557 (2006).
82
Id. at 630 (quoting Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners
of War art. 3, came into force Oct. 21, 1950, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135).
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ecutive’s initial argument—that the Court should abstain from decid83
ing the issues in the case at all. Rather, in light of “‘the duty which
rests on the courts, in time of war as well as in time of peace, to preserve unimpaired the constitutional safeguards of civil liberty,’” the
Court explained, “‘the public interest require[s] that we consider and
84
decide those questions without any avoidable delay.’” The Court was
even more direct in rejecting the executive’s claim that it should prevail on the merits of its argument that Geneva had no application to
85
Hamdan’s case. With no mention of deference and calling the government’s treaty interpretation simply “erroneous,” the Court held
86
that Common Article 3 applied to the armed conflict at issue. While
the Court recognized that the treaty was ambiguous in some respects,
it did not hesitate in concluding that the executive’s commissions did
87
not satisfy what requirements there were.
2. Interpreting Statutes
To the extent the Court’s post–September 11 statutory cases have
addressed the question of interpretive deference at all, they likewise
show little indication that the Court believes extraordinary deference is
due in foreign relations law—and, indeed, often appear to apply a less
deferential standard than the Court uses when construing statutory
grants of authority to executive agencies in administrative law. Consid-

83

See id. at 584-85 (addressing the Government’s argument that the Court should
apply the “judge-made rule that civilian courts should await the final outcome of ongoing military proceedings before entertaining an attack on those proceedings” (quoting Brief for Respondents at 12, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (No. 050184))); see also id. at 587-88 (finding that the commission review system “clearly
lack[s] the structural insulation from military influence that characterizes the Court of
Appeals for the Armed Forces, and thus bear[s] insufficient conceptual similarity to
state courts to warrant invocation of abstention principles”).
84
Id. at 588 (quoting Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 19 (1942)); see also id. at 589
(concluding that despite the executive’s claims of military necessity, “the Government
has identified no other ‘important countervailing interest’ that would permit federal
courts to depart from their general ‘duty to exercise the jurisdiction that is conferred
upon them by Congress’” (quoting Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 716
(1996) (Kennedy, J., concurring))).
85
See id. at 625-35 (describing the executive’s argument).
86
Id. at 630-32.
87
See id. at 635 (“Common Article 3 obviously tolerates a great degree of flexibility
in trying individuals captured during armed conflict; its requirements are general
ones, crafted to accommodate a wide variety of legal systems. But requirements they are
nonetheless. The commission that the President has convened to try Hamdan does
not meet those requirements.”).
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88

er Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, in which the Court was called to determine
whether the President’s detention of a U.S. citizen, whom the government alleged the U.S. military seized during operations in Afghanistan,
89
was authorized by the 2001 AUMF. In defending its authority to detain Yaser Hamdi as an “enemy combatant,” the executive insisted that
the question whether “captured enemy combatants are entitled to POW
privileges under the [Third Geneva Convention] is a quintessential
matter that the Constitution (not to mention the [Convention]) leaves
90
to the political branches and, in particular, the President.”
While recognizing that the AUMF afforded the executive at least
91
some statutory authority to detain Hamdi, the plurality opinion reads
as a vigorous endorsement of independent judicial review. As Justice
O’Connor explained, the AUMF must be read to authorize Hamdi’s
detention not because an alternative reading would infringe the President’s constitutional power or other separation-of-powers interests,
but because, by the Justices’ own reading of “longstanding law-of-war
92
93
principles” and international “‘agreement and practice,’” detention
“to prevent a combatant’s return to the battlefield is a fundamental
94
incident of waging war.” If in the Court’s judgment, “the practical circumstances of a given conflict are entirely unlike those of the conflicts
that informed the development of the law of war, that understanding

88

542 U.S. 507 (2004).
See 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note (2006) (authorizing the President to “use all necessary
and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines
planned, authorized, committed, or aided” the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks).
90
Brief for Respondents at 24 n.9, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (No. 036696). To be clear, the executive’s claim was not that the Court should defer to a particular determination by the President of a particular detainee’s eligibility for POW status
on the facts. Rather, this was a generalized conclusion about the relevance of the Convention to a conflict between two state parties to the treaty (the United States and Afghanistan). See id. at 12 (“[T]he nature of judicial review available with respect to the military’s enemy-combatant determination is limited by the profound separation-of-powers
concerns implicated by efforts to second-guess the factual basis for the exercise of the
Commander in Chief’s authority to detain a captured enemy combatant in wartime.”).
91
The plurality made it clear that it was limiting its reading of the AUMF detention
authority to the particular facts of Hamdi’s case. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 516 (plurality
opinion) (adopting, “for purposes of this case,” the government’s definition of an
“enemy combatant” as one who was “‘part of or supporting forces hostile to the United
States or coalition partners’ in Afghanistan and who ‘engaged in an armed conflict
against the United States’ there” (quoting Brief for Respondents, supra note 90, at 3)).
92
Id. at 521.
93
Id. at 518 (quoting Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 30 (1942)).
94
Id. at 519.
89
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may unravel.” Indeed, as Justice O’Connor then noted in rejecting
the executive’s view that the process provided to Hamdi was sufficient:
While we accord the greatest respect and consideration to the judgments
of military authorities in matters relating to the actual prosecution of a
war, and recognize that the scope of that discretion necessarily is wide, it
does not infringe on the core role of the military for the courts to exercise their own time-honored and constitutionally mandated roles of re96
viewing and resolving claims like those presented here.

Notably, whatever deference may be due—and it appeared not to be
much—it was due not to the President in particular or the executive
writ large, but to “the judgments of military authorities” who are functionally expert on the issue.
97
Hamdi’s companion case, Rasul v. Bush, tested the Court’s authority more directly. The executive had argued that the federal courts
lacked jurisdiction to consider petitions that noncitizen detainees held
98
at Guantanamo Bay brought under the federal habeas statute. Yet in
rejecting the government’s jurisdictional argument, the Court was not
deterred by the notion that it should defer to the executive’s interpretation of the habeas statute. According to the Court, the presumption
against extraterritorial application of federal statutes that the executive
invoked had no relevance where U.S. territory was at issue—and the
99
military base at Guantanamo was, effectively, just such a place.
95

Id. at 521.
Id. at 535 (citing Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 233-34 (1944) (Murphy, J., dissenting) (“[L]ike other claims conflicting with the asserted constitutional
rights of the individual, the military claim must subject itself to the judicial process of
having its reasonableness determined and its conflicts with other interests reconciled.”); Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 401 (1932) (“What are the allowable limits of military discretion, and whether or not they have been overstepped in a particular case, are judicial questions.”)).
97
542 U.S. 466 (2004).
98
See id. at 475 (“Respondents’ primary submission is that the answer to the jurisdictional question is controlled by . . . Eisentrager.”); see also Brief for Respondents at 14-25,
Rasul, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (Nos. 03-0334, 03-0343) (citing Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S.
763 (1950), as controlling precedent). Among other arguments, the government contended that the presumption against extraterritorial application of statutes “‘has special
force when we are construing treaty and statutory provisions that may involve foreign and
military affairs for which the President has unique responsibility.’” Id. at 19 (quoting Sale
v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 188 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)).
99
See Rasul, 542 U.S. at 487 (“From a practical perspective, the indefinite lease of
Guantanamo Bay has produced a place that belongs to the United States, extending
the ‘implied protection’ of the United States to it.” (quoting Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at
777-78)). Because “sovereignty” per se was not the touchstone of jurisdictional authority, the executive’s interpretation of the U.S.-Cuba lease agreement (allowing Cuba to
retain “ultimate sovereignty”) in this regard was similarly irrelevant.
96
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100

In any event, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld soon dispelled whatever expectation of unquestioned deference on issues of statutory interpretation remained. In addition to its treaty arguments, the executive argued that the AUMF and the statutory Uniform Code of Military
101
Justice (UCMJ) should be read to extend executive authority to try
Hamdan in a military commission. The use of military commissions
was a “necessary” part of the “necessary and appropriate force” the
AUMF authorized the President to use, and “courts are not competent
to second-guess judgments of the political branches regarding the ex102
In addition, the govtent of force necessary to prosecute a war.”
ernment argued that Article 36 of the UCMJ squarely “authorize[d]
the President to establish procedures ‘for cases arising under this
103
chapter triable in . . . military commissions.’” Under that provision,
the President was delegated broad authority to establish the rules for
commission proceedings, including rules different from those generally recognized in criminal cases, whenever the President “considers”
104
Deference was
application of those rules to be not “practicable.”
due the President’s judgment on what counts as “practicable” by the
terms of the statute itself. Here, the President had already made such
a dispositive finding in his executive order, which provided that “the
danger to the safety of the United States and the nature of interna105
tional terrorism” made standard criminal trials impracticable.
On its face, the executive’s argument that it was entitled to some
measure of deference in interpreting the AUMF and UCMJ seems
squarely within the Curtiss-Wright tradition of interpreting delegations
of power broadly. Alternatively, the executive might have been accorded Chevron deference, with the President in the role of an expert
agency—and therefore one whose interpretation should prevail as
106
long as it is reasonable.
Yet in an opinion that mentioned neither

100

548 U.S. 557 (2006).
10 U.S.C. § 836 (2006).
102
Brief for Respondents at 19, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (No.
05-0184).
103
Id. at 18 (quoting Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 836 (2006)).
104
Id.
105
Id. at 47 n.22 (quoting Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001: Detention, Treatment,
and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 3 C.F.R. 918 (2009)).
106
See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865-66
(1984) (holding that when a statute’s meaning is ambiguous, the Court will defer to the
agency’s judgment as long as it is reasonable); see also United States v. Mead Corp., 533
U.S. 218, 229 (2001) (clarifying the scope of Chevron deference to require a delegation
by Congress of authority to make regulations “with the force of law.”).
101
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Curtiss-Wright nor Chevron, the Court rejected the government’s arguments in a technical, purely de novo analysis of the relevant UCMJ
provisions. In the Court’s view, the President’s generalized finding
107
about the viability of criminal trials was “insufficient.” Statutory language requiring commission and court martial procedures to be “uni108
form” to the extent “practicable” did not say that uniformity could
109
be waived whenever the President “consider[ed]” it impracticable.
110
This statutory standard required uniformity “insofar as practicable” —a
seemingly more objective test. And even if it were possible to satisfy the
requirement without an “official determination,” the Court deemed the
111
impracticability requirement “not satisfied here.” Why? “Nothing in
the record before us demonstrates that it would be impracticable to ap112
Even assuming that the Presiply court-martial rules in this case.”
dent’s generalized finding that criminal trials were inadequate was relevant to the impracticability inquiry, and even assuming that such a
113
finding “would be entitled to a measure of deference” under the statute, “the only reason offered in support of that determination is the
114
While the Court emphadanger posed by international terrorism.”
sized that it did not “for one moment underestimat[e] that danger,” it
found no specific reason in the record for challenging the notion that
115
standard court-martial rules would work.
The Court’s most recent cases involving the availability of statutory
remedies for military detainees did not substantially alter the notably
nondeferential Hamdan landscape in this regard. Boumediene v. Bush
struck down a key provision of the Military Commissions Act of 2006
(MCA)—one attempting to strip the courts of jurisdiction to hear the
habeas petitions of Guantanamo detainees—as an unconstitutional
116
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.
Rejecting the executive’s
proposed construction of the statute that might have rendered alternative statutory procedures a constitutionally adequate substitute for
habeas, the Court found the MCA constitutionally deficient despite
the availability of both the canon of constitutional avoidance (which
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116

Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 622.
10 U.S.C. § 836(b) (2006).
Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 622.
10 U.S.C. § 836(b) (emphasis added).
Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 623.
Id.
Id. at 623 n.51.
Id. at 623.
Id. at 624.
See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 787-92 (2008).
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the Court mentioned explicitly) and the possibility of judicial deference to executive interpretation that might have facilitated a decision
117
finding a constitutionally permissible construction of the MCA.
While dicta in the Court’s opinion indicated some deference to the
judgment of the political branches that Hamdi, Rasul, and Hamdan
had entirely ignored, that passing language seemed to do little work
118
in the Court’s analysis, and it did not affect the outcome of the case.
119
Munaf v. Geren, in contrast, does appear to rely on the notion of
deference to the political branches. There, the Court rejected on the
merits habeas petitions filed by U.S. citizens held by U.S.-led multinational forces in Iraq. Petitioners had asked the Court to enjoin their
transfer to Iraqi authorities for prosecution, arguing that transfer
would violate U.S. treaty and statutory obligations not to send individ120
uals to another country where they were likely to face torture. While

117

See id. at 789 (concluding there was “no way to construe the statute to allow
what is also constitutionally required in this context: an opportunity for the detainee
to present relevant exculpatory evidence that was not made part of the record in the
earlier proceedings”); see also id. at 792 (“To hold that the detainees at Guantanamo
may, under the DTA, challenge the President’s legal authority to detain them, contest
the CSRT’s findings of fact, supplement the record on review with exculpatory evidence, and request an order of release would come close to reinstating the § 2241 habeas corpus process Congress sought to deny them. The language of the statute, read
in light of Congress’s reasons for enacting it, cannot bear this interpretation.”).
118
See id. at 796 (“In considering both the procedural and substantive standards
used to impose detention to prevent acts of terrorism, proper deference must be accorded to the political branches.”). Yet, from his mention of deference, Justice Kennedy drew at most a conclusion of policy, not one of interpretation: “The law must
accord the Executive substantial authority to apprehend and detain those who pose a
real danger to our security.” Id. at 797. Beyond that, the opinion is notably obscure
on how deference is to be accorded and to whom. One most easily reads Justice Kennedy as understanding the deference obligation to go to Congress and the President—
not to the executive alone. Indeed, far from embracing traditional deference-like justifications, such as the danger that court involvement would risk embarrassment of
multifarious pronouncements from different branches, Justice Kennedy insisted that
the exercise of executive authority is “vindicated, not eroded, when confirmed by”
courts. Id. Moreover, Justice Scalia categorically rejected the notion that the Court’s
posture was deferential in any regard. On the contrary, Scalia found Justice Kennedy’s
approach “a pose of faux deference to Congress and the President. . . . What the Court
apparently means is that the political branches can debate, after which the Third
Branch will decide.” Id. at 830 n.1 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
119
553 U.S. 674 (2008).
120
Id. at 703 n.6 (citing the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998,
Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 2242(a), 112 Stat. 2681-822, and the Convention Against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. 3, registered
June 26, 1987, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 20 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (“No State Party shall
expel, return (refouler) or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial
grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.”)).
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again rejecting the executive’s contention that the habeas statute did
not authorize federal court jurisdiction in the case, the Court concluded rather broadly that “in the present context [the risk of torture]
121
is to be addressed by the political branches, not the judiciary.” Here,
the State Department had determined that the Iraqi prisons have
“‘generally met internationally accepted standards for basic prisoner
122
needs,’” and according to the Solicitor General, “the United States
would object to [the multinational forces’] transfer of [petitioner] to
123
Iraqi custody if it thought that he would likely be tortured.” The per
curiam opinion embraced the executive’s position, noting that the
Court was “not suited to second-guess” the government’s judgment of
124
“whether there is a serious prospect of torture at the hands of an ally.”
Although the Court’s attitude toward the executive here feels different, it would be a mistake to conclude that the Court’s broad language has any bearing on its view of the significance of executive statutory (or treaty) interpretation. Importantly, the Court declined to
reach the full merits of the detainees’ statutory claims on the ground
that they had not successfully raised them in the courts below. Similarly, the deference the Court appears to be exercising is not to an interpretation by the executive of its own legal authority, but rather to
its assessment of the relevant facts—namely, whether the detainees
were likely to face torture at the hands of the Iraqis. Deference to an
executive’s finding of facts carries far less significance for our understanding of judicial power than does deference on questions of law.
Appeals courts defer to superior factfinders with regularity—whether
juries, trial courts, or administrative judges—with no special significance for the scope of Article III power. With Munaf most easily read
to embrace this brand of deference, it has fewer implications for the
125
power of the courts “to say what the law is.”
B. The Elusive Promise of Chevron
In the wake of such decisions, it is not surprising that scholars
have turned renewed attention to the task of identifying a doctrine of
“deference” in foreign relations law. Whether driven by the norma121

Id. at 700.
Reply Brief for the Federal Parties at 23, Munaf, 553 U.S. 674 (Nos. 07-0394 and
06-1666) (quoting Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, & Labor, Iraq, U.S. DEP’T OF
STATE (Mar. 11, 2008), http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2007/100596.htm).
123
Id. at 23.
124
Munaf, 553 U.S. at 702.
125
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (emphasis added).
122
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tive concern that the Court was no longer taking sufficient account of
126
the executive’s superior expertise and political responsiveness, or
by the rule-of-law interest in providing some interpretive guidance to
127
the Court, the particular challenge of balancing the executive’s interpretive power against the Court’s has reemerged as a vexing problem. While rejecting the notion that the executive’s “primacy in the
interpretation of international law” gives him the power to ignore
treaty requirements that are otherwise clear, scholars such as Sunstein and Posner have argued that courts should defer to executive
interpretations of ambiguous statutes and treaties in this realm in
much the same way deference has been given to executive agency in128
Cheterpretations since the Court’s watershed opinion in Chevron.
vron famously established a two-step inquiry that courts were to follow
in ascertaining how to account for executive views when reviewing
agency interpretations of statutory authority. Where the Court finds
statutory meaning clear in the first instance, no further interpretive
129
inquiry is necessary. But where the meaning of the statute is ambiguous, the Court ceases its usual exercise in determining the law’s
import and inquires only whether the executive agency’s interpreta130
tion is a “permissible construction of the statute.” If it is, no further
judicial inquiry into the meaning of the law is necessary. So too,
Sunstein and Posner have suggested that, in foreign relations law, the
executive’s interpretation of ambiguous laws should prevail as long as
131
its interpretation is reasonable.
In this view, Chevron is thought to carry several advantages over a
more generalized assumption of judicial deference to the President
in the foreign relations setting. Chevron is “well-entrenched in the
Supreme Court, with all of the nine current justices [at the time of

126

See, e.g., Posner & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 1176 (arguing that courts should defer to the executive’s foreign policy expertise); Sunstein, Administrative Law Goes to War,
supra note 11, at 2671 (arguing for a generous interpretation of presidential powers).
127
See, e.g., Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 23, at 2084 (proposing to provide “a
more systematic account” of the factors “relevant to interpreting the AUMF”); Chesney, supra note 12, at 1727 (lamenting that “the deference doctrine appears more unsettled and indeterminate than ever before”); Sullivan, supra note 36, at 781 (noting
that courts have “failed to provide any clarity in [the] doctrine” for determining what
degree of deference is appropriate).
128
Posner & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 1221-22.
129
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984).
130
Id. at 843.
131
Posner & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 1222.
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Bradley’s writing] accepting its basic framework.” It thus promises
a more regularized approach to judicial engagement with executive
law interpretation and could help not only cabin judicial discretion,
but also clarify the rules of interpretation for Congress, agencies,
133
and lower courts. Moreover, Chevron could serve an important set
of functional goals:
[Chevron] pushes “interpretive lawmaking” to government entities that
have more expertise and democratic accountability than courts. In addition, by centralizing this lawmaking in the executive branch rather than
in a diffuse court system, the Chevron doctrine is designed to promote
uniformity in the law. And by allowing for changes in interpretation, it
134
seeks to promote flexibility in regulatory governance.

It is argued that, if anything, the doctrine’s functional rationale—
grounded in the executive’s superior political accountability and expertise—-is even stronger in foreign relations than in traditional administrative law. Because the executive bears the primary political
burden of failures in foreign relations, the executive attends to those
relationships closely and is best positioned both to assess present facts
and to predict what future consequences legal interpretations will
135
have. Chevron thus offers a useful middle ground between the neartotal deference courts were thought to have shown in foreign relations
law, and a Marbury-based insistence that the Court’s approach to statutory and treaty interpretation should be fundamentally independent
of executive views.
In exploring methods of guiding judicial engagement with executive views, there can be little doubt that the Court’s recent foreign relations cases challenge traditional accounts of judicial deference. Yet the
perceived strengths of Chevron in particular—in doctrinal clarity and attention to functional concerns—may be more elusive than its advocates
suggest. Chevron’s doctrinal stability is in fact increasingly precarious,
and its flexibility in taking functional interests into account is in key respects quite limited. More than that, Chevron carried with it, and still
carries, substantial questions about how it may be applied while main132

Bradley, supra note 11, at 673. Note, however, that since Bradley’s article was
published in 2000, several new Justices have been confirmed to the Court.
133
See id. at 668, 773-75 (discussing disadvantages of a multifactor approach and
advantages of Chevron). But see Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive
Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 970 (1992) (arguing that the Court continued to rely on
multifactor tests despite Chevron).
134
Bradley, supra note 11, at 673 (footnotes omitted).
135
Posner & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 1206-07 (noting that the executive is far
more politically accountable than the courts in the face of foreign policy crises).
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taining the integrity of the formal judicial power. In the years after Chevron came down, many scholars saw the decision as a sign that the Court
was prepared to abdicate a significant portion of the judicial power
136
It was one thing for a
identified in Marbury “to say what the law is.”
court to take executive factfinding and expert analysis into account in
understanding the scope of Congress’s delegation. It was another thing
for the Court to pretermit its own interpretive inquiry because the executive had a greater claim to democratic legitimacy across the board.
If the executive’s political bona fides matter in interpreting laws delegating power to an agency, why not cede interpretive power to the executive altogether? While scholars have developed a set of theories attempting to explain how the judicial power may be shared in this
regard, as shall be discussed below, the formal dilemma very much persists. For these reasons, as this Section details, Chevron seems a less than
ideal candidate for resolving how the courts and the executive should
share interpretive power in the law of foreign relations.
1. The Chevron that Survives
It is perhaps more than a little ironic that Chevron has gained interest from foreign relations scholars at the same time that scholars of
administrative law have been demonstrating with increasing persuasiveness how limited the impact of Chevron has been in cases reviewing
agency statutory interpretation. One of the most comprehensive empirical studies available finds that, from the time Chevron was decided
in 1984 through the Court’s 2005 Term, Chevron “was applied in only
8.3% of Supreme Court cases evaluating agency statutory interpreta137
Indeed, to the extent it is possible to tell a unified, qualitations.”
tive story about the trajectory of the Court’s major administrative law
cases since 1984, it is mostly a story that sees the Court narrowing the
range of agency decisions to which Chevron might apply and insisting
upon the significant interpretive power the Court retains even within
the Chevron regime. More, it shows a Court chafing against the some-

136

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803); see also, e.g., Stephen
Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 370 (1986)
(describing the assumption that Congress delegates lawmaking power to the executive
agency as a “legal fiction”); Sunstein, Beyond Marbury, supra note 11, at 2589 (describing Chevron as “a kind of counter-Marbury for the administrative state”).
137
Eskridge & Baer, supra note 51, at 1090. In the vast majority of the 1014 cases
the Court decided during this period in which an executive agency interpretation of a
statute was at issue, the Court applied either less stringent deference than that afforded by Chevron, or no apparent deference at all. Id. at 1121.
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times awkward limits Chevron seems to impose on why executive views
might matter and when they may be taken into interpretive account.
The story of Chevron’s less-than-transformative impact is not inconsistent with the doctrine’s origin and history. By the time Chevron
came down in 1984, the Court had been grappling for decades with
138
how to treat executive agency interpretations of federal statutes. In
this effort, the Court had long recognized—as it reiterated in Chevron—that executive agency views could help give a “‘full understanding of the force of the statutory policy’” when a given situation “‘depend[s] upon more than ordinary knowledge respecting the matters
139
Nonetheless, as Chevron itself insubjected to agency regulations.’”
sisted, “[t]he judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construction and must reject administrative constructions which are con140
trary to clear congressional intent.” Judges were to retain significant
independent authority to determine whether a statute is clear or ambiguous—often the end of an interpretive inquiry—and to determine
whether an agency’s interpretation is “reasonable,” also a seemingly
141
broad retention of power.
Nonetheless, Chevron was broadly seen as revolutionary in identifying the executive’s superior political accountability—and the Court’s
correspondingly limited credentials in that realm—and in citing that
functional strength as a central basis for deferring to an agency inter142
pretation of a statute.
As the Court famously explained: “While

138

See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844
(1984) (“We have long recognized that considerable weight should be accorded to an
executive department’s construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer.”); see also Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159, 1170-71 (2009) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Judicial deference to agencies’ views on statutes
they administer was not born in Chevron . . . , nor did the ‘singularly judicial role of
marking the boundaries of agency choice’ die with that case.” (quoting Young v. Cmty.
Nutrition Inst., 476 U.S. 974, 988 (1986) (Stevens, J. dissenting))).
139
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844 (quoting United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 382
(1961)); see also id. at 865 (“Judges are not experts in the field . . . .”).
140
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9.
141
See Jonathan T. Molot, Reexamining Marbury in the Administrative State: A Structural and Institutional Defense of Judicial Power over Statutory Interpretation, 96 NW. U. L.
REV. 1239, 1243-44 (2002) (detailing the power over interpretation the Court retained
even under Chevron).
142
See, e.g., Eskridge & Baer, supra note 51, at 1086-87 (“Almost immediately, Reagan Administration officials and appointees proclaimed a ‘Chevron Revolution.’”);
Merrill, supra note 133, at 976 (“Justice Stevens’[s] opinion contained several features
that can only be described as ‘revolutionary,’ even if no revolution was intended at the
time.” (quoting Kenneth W. Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON
REG. 283, 284 (1986))); see also Sunstein, Beyond Marbury, supra note 11, at 2596 (de-
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agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the
Government to make such policy choices” in interpreting ambiguous
143
statutes. Accordingly, “federal judges—who have no constituency—
have a duty to respect legitimate policy choices made by those who
144
do.” Statutory interpretation was, at least at the ambiguous margins,
a task that demanded policy judgments of various sorts—judgments
best carried out by one or the other political branch. It would thus be
assumed that an ambiguous statute was Congress’s implicit attempt to
leave some interpretive power with the executive agency.
Yet the Chevron-revolution understanding quickly bumped up
against a series of indications from the Court that the case was perhaps intended as a less dramatic shift than it first appeared. Just two
terms later, the Court clarified Chevron’s import in this respect. In INS
145
v. Cardoza-Fonseca, the Court rejected a statutory interpretation offered by the federal Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) and empha146
sized the extent to which the Court retains interpretive primacy. It
also made clear the potential frequency with which the Court could
decide matters of interpretation at Chevron’s first step:
The judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construction and
must reject administrative constructions which are contrary to clear congressional intent. If a court, employing traditional tools of statutory construction, ascertains that Congress had an intention on the precise ques147
tion at issue, that intention is the law and must be given effect.

If, as in Cardoza-Fonseca, the statute’s text and ordinary canons of
construction persuade the Court that the statute is clear, the agency’s
view is irrelevant. Justice Scalia wrote separately, insisting that the
Court’s purported clarification was in fact an “evisceration of Che148
vron.” If the Court is able to ignore an agency’s statutory interpretation any time the Court thinks it can glean the meaning of the statute
149
on its own, Chevron is no more than a “doctrine of desperation.” As
scribing Chevron and McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), as giving
broad discretion to the executive to choose how to interpret statutes).
143
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865.
144
Id. at 866.
145
480 U.S. 421 (1987).
146
Id. at 448 (rejecting the interpretation put forward by the Immigration Judge
and BIA).
147
Id. at 447-48 (citations omitted in Cardoza-Fonseca) (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at
843 n.9) (internal quotation marks omitted).
148
Id. at 454 (Scalia, J., concurring).
149
Id.
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it turned out, Justice Scalia was hardly alone in assessing the case as a
150
challenge to the revolutionary view of Chevron.
The years since Cardoza-Fonseca have seen the development of a
line of decisions that further limit the range of cases in which Chevron
151
guides judicial engagement with agency interpretation. United States
v. Mead Corp., for instance, presented the question of whether a tariff
classification ruling by the U.S. Customs Service was entitled to Che152
153
The Court held that it was not.
In the Court’s
vron deference.
view, there was no indication in the agency’s ruling letter that the
agency “ever set out with a lawmaking pretense in mind when it un154
Mead thus clarified the
dertook to make classifications like these.”
155
existence of what scholars have since called Chevron step zero. That
is, before the Court considers whether a statute is ambiguous, it must
determine (not just assume) that Congress intended to delegate the
agency the power to issue rules with the force of law and that the
agency interpretation to which deference is claimed was in fact prom156
ulgated in the exercise of that power. In the absence of such an express delegation of legislative power, Chevron does not apply. Instead,
the Court would employ the more flexible, pre-Chevron doctrine of at157
tention to executive views outlined in Skidmore v. Swift & Co. —that
agency views are entitled to respect “to the extent that those interpreta158
tions have the ‘power to persuade.’” As the Mead Court put it, “The
150

See, e.g., Sunstein, Beyond Marbury, supra note 11, at 2604 (“Taken on its face,
Cardoza-Fonseca seems to be an effort to restore the pre-Chevron status quo by asserting
the primacy of the judiciary on purely legal questions.”).
151
See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001) (holding that
Chevron deference only applies to statutory interpretation where Congress delegates
the agency authority to make rules with “the force of law”); Christensen v. Harris Cnty.,
529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (holding that interpretations in opinion letters do not warrant Chevron deference because, like interpretations in policy statements, manuals, or
guidelines, they lack the force of law).
152
Mead, 533 U.S. at 221.
153
Id.
154
Mead, 533 U.S. at 233. The Court supported this conclusion with the observations that “Customs does not generally engage in notice-and-comment practice when
issuing [ruling letters], and their treatment by the agency makes it clear that a letter’s
binding character as a ruling stops short of third parties.” Id.
155
See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO.
L.J. 833, 873 (2001).
156
Id.
157
323 U.S. 134 (1944).
158
Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (quoting Skidmore, 323 U.S.
at 140); see also Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140 (“[T]he rulings, interpretations and opinions of
the [agency administrator], while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and

PEARLSTEIN REVISED FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

814

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

2/3/2011 11:53 AM

[Vol. 159: 783

fair measure of deference to an agency administering its own statute has
been understood to vary with circumstances, and courts have looked to
the degree of the agency’s care, its consistency, formality, and relative
159
expertness, and to the persuasiveness of the agency’s position.”
At the same time, the Court has also moved to limit Chevron deference based on a new theory that seems to turn Chevron’s politicalaccountability rationale on its head. Consider FDA v. Brown & Wil160
liamson Tobacco Corp., in which tobacco companies challenged the
authority of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to issue a rule
regulating tobacco as a drug (and thereby limiting its marketing to
children). Rejecting the FDA’s interpretation of its own authority as
extending to the regulation of tobacco products, a bare majority of
the Court effectively explained its decision not to defer to the agency
on the grounds that some issues were too political to be left to the
161
Foreshadowing Mead, the Court explained
more political branch.
that where the “history and the breadth of the authority that the FDA
has asserted” would give it the power to ban cigarettes entirely, ending
a multibillion dollar industry and the manufacture of a product with a
“unique political history” in the United States, Congress would have
been much clearer than it was in expressing its intent to delegate to
162
Given the political stakes,
the agency such authority in the statute.
the Court preferred its own, highly contextual construction of the statute (ironically attributing the result to Congress) to that of the FDA—
163
the agency’s superior political accountability notwithstanding.

litigants may properly resort for guidance. The weight of such a judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of
its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.”).
159
Mead, 533 U.S. at 228 (footnotes omitted).
160
529 U.S. 120 (2000).
161
See id. at 125-26 (holding, in a 5–4 decision, that the Court would not defer to
the FDA on the question of whether Congress meant to delegate the agency the power
to regulate tobacco as a drug).
162
Id. at 159-60.
163
See id. at 126-27 (noting that the FDA rulemaking that produced the tobacco
regulation followed the FDA’s receipt of more than 700,000 public submissions, “more
than ‘at any other time in its history on any other subject’” (quoting Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396, 44,418 (Aug. 28,
1996))). The dissent rejected the notion that relative political accountability between
an executive agency and Congress made any difference in such a case. See id. at 190-91
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Insofar as the decision to regulate tobacco reflects the policy
of an administration, it is a decision for which that administration, and those politically
elected officials who support it, must (and will) take responsibility. . . . I do not believe
that an administrative agency decision of this magnitude—one that is important, con-
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The extraordinary-cases principle seems to cut to the core of what
made Chevron seem so radical. If the Court’s awareness of its limited
political accountability were Chevron’s primary raison d’etre, one would
assume that it would be precisely in these extraordinary cases that the
Court’s deference to the judgment of the political branches would be at
its height. Yet however counterintuitive its rationale (at least from this
perspective), the extraordinary-cases exception has now appeared more
than once. Both in refusing to defer to the Attorney General’s finding
that doctors assisting terminally ill patients to commit suicide pursuant
to an Oregon law would be subject to prosecution under the federal
164
Controlled Substances Act, and in rejecting the Environmental Protection Agency’s interpretation that it lacked the statutory authority to
165
regulate greenhouse gases, the Court has denied Chevron deference
on the grounds that Congress could not have intended to delegate interpretive power of such political salience. As the Court put it most
memorably, Congress “‘does not alter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary provisions—it does not, one
166
might say, hide elephants in mouseholes.’”
The Court’s most recent Chevron decisions have reinforced that its
formal interpretive power extends even to cases titularly falling under
Chevron. These cases also appear to embrace the Skidmore-type view
that what determines the weight accorded the executive’s interpretation is not merely that it comes from the executive, but that it comes
from a process or with a record that renders the interpretation persuasive on its own terms. In Negusie v. Holder, for instance, the Court reviewed the Board of Immigration Affairs’s (BIA’s) interpretation of a
167
statute that was, by the Court’s own assessment, ambiguous.
The
Court thus noted at the outset that Chevron deference would apply: as
long as the agency’s interpretation was reasonable, the Court would
168
Indeed, as Justice Kennedy wrote for the
defer to the agency view.

spicuous, and controversial—can escape the kind of public scrutiny that is essential in
any democracy. And such a review will take place whether it is the Congress or the Executive Branch that makes the relevant decision.”).
164
See Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 258 (2006) (holding that the Attorney
General’s interpretation was not due Chevron deference).
165
See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 533-34 (2007) (finding the EPA’s refusal to determine whether greenhouse gases cause climate change to be arbitrary
and capricious).
166
Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 267 (quoting Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531
U.S. 457, 468 (2001)).
167
129 S. Ct. 1159, 1164 (2009).
168
Id. at 1163-66.
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majority: “Judicial deference in the immigration context is of special
importance, for executive officials ‘exercise especially sensitive political
169
Yet the
functions that implicate questions of foreign relations.’”
Court then proceeded to reject the BIA’s reading of the relevant statute as a mistake in interpretation, concluding that in its case-by-case
application of the statute, the agency had erroneously thought itself
bound by an earlier Supreme Court case: “The BIA deemed its interpretation to be mandated by [the Court’s earlier decision in] Fedorenko,
and that error prevented it from a full consideration of the statutory
170
The BIA had thus not actually exercised
question here presented.”
its interpretive authority but simply determined that Fedorenko controls.
The Court’s reasoning in Negusie is a puzzle in several respects.
First, it is not at all clear what distance exists between “exercising interpretive authority” and applying law an agency believes to be binding. Applying relevant precedent would seem to be part and parcel of
exercising interpretive authority. As long as agency interpretation of
precedent is “reasonable,” it should receive Chevron deference. Perhaps to avoid this dilemma, Justice Kennedy’s opinion turned Chevron
upside down: “Whether [the agency] interpretation would be reasonable, and thus owed Chevron deference, is a legitimate question; but it
171
is not now before us.” Chevron, of course, would have the Court inquire first as to whether the statute was ambiguous—a determination
that it had already made in this case. Having decided that the statute
was ambiguous, the Court’s only remaining inquiry under Chevron was
to the reasonableness of the BIA’s interpretation. The Court did not
engage in this inquiry. It therefore seems that the Court was not applying Chevron in any direct sense. Instead, the Court emphasized
that, statutory ambiguity notwithstanding, the agency had not done
enough to justify Skidmore deference. In remanding the case to the
agency to try again to exercise its “Chevron discretion,” the Court was
expressly prescriptive. It held that the agency must “‘bring its expertise to bear upon the matter; . . . evaluate the evidence; . . . make an
initial determination; and, in doing so, it can, through informed discussion and analysis, help a court later determine whether its decision
169

Id. at 1163-64 (quoting INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 110 (1988)). As Justice
Kennedy explained: “The Attorney General’s decision to bar an alien who has participated in persecution ‘may affect our relations with [the alien’s native] country or its
neighbors. The judiciary is not well positioned to shoulder primary responsibility for
assessing the likelihood and importance of such diplomatic repercussions.’” Id. at
1164-65 (quoting INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425 (1999)).
170
Id. at 1166.
171
Id.
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exceeds the leeway that the law provides.” In short, the agency view
was relevant not per se but only insofar as it could contribute something to the task of interpretation that the Court itself could not.
Regardless whether it is fair to say the Court has replaced Chevron
173
with, as Justice Scalia put it, “th’ol’ ‘totality of the circumstances’ test,”
it is hard to argue that the Chevron doctrine is settled. The Court does
not afford agencies deference every time an ambiguous statute is before
it. The Court remains interested in, and determined to engage, a variety of functional factors in weighing the relevance and persuasiveness of
executive views in a growing range of circumstances: where Congress
has not delegated power to issue rules with the force of law, where the
political consequences of the interpretive question are too important to
leave to the broad discretion of an executive agency, and, as ever, where
the Court feels capable of managing the interpretive task on its own.
Political accountability matters, but so do subject-matter expertise and a
reasoned decisionmaking process that takes that expertise into account.
In Chevron and thereafter, the Court has asserted a strong, if incompletely theorized, sense of its own formal authority to say what the law
is—both within the confines of the doctrine and without. In short, Chevron does not seem likely to serve as a panacea for interpretive confusion if imported into the realm of foreign relations law.
2. Chevron’s Functional Failings
While foreign relations scholars may be overly optimistic about
the ability of Chevron to bring doctrinal clarity to the allocation of interpretive authority between the Court and the executive, they are
right to consider the role of functional interests, such as expertise and
accountability, in assessing how the Court should engage executive interpretations of law. To the extent that sharing duties in law interpretation raises separation-of-powers concerns, functional analysis is often
unavoidable—and it is sometimes required to understand the struc174
Sunstein and Posner may be
tural provisions of the Constitution.
172

Id. at 1167-68 (quoting Gonzalez v. Thomas, 547 U.S. 183, 186-87 (2006) (per
curiam)). Indeed, Justice Kennedy noted “[t]hese matters may have relevance in determining whether its statutory interpretation is a permissible one.” Id.
173
United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 241 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
There are, of course, some cases in which the Court has pursued a more straightforward application of Chevron. See, e.g., Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 217-22 (2002)
(applying the Chevron two-step test to determine whether to defer to the Social Security
Administration’s interpretation of a statutory definition).
174
Deborah N. Pearlstein, Form and Function in the National Security Constitution, 41
CONN. L. REV. 1549, 1571-86 (2009).
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faulted for paying insufficient attention to the protection of individual
rights as a functional interest in separation of powers, with an equal or
greater claim to structural priority than interests in accountability and
175
Their claims may also overstate the executive’s instituexpertise.
tional competence to handle security matters with minimal involve176
ment of the other branches. But Sunstein and Posner are right that
functional interests in accountability and expertise are at least as salient in matters of national security and foreign relations as they are in
177
traditional administrative law.
It is worth pausing on this conclusion, for it runs counter to past
assumptions that “[t]he propriety of deference may well vary depend178
ing on the type of law at issue.”
Indeed, there are increasingly
strong reasons to doubt both the descriptive and normative validity of
such subject-matter exceptionalism. The modern national security
bureaucracy, like more traditional administrative settings, channels
decisionmaking through a set of existing organizations and agencies,
each with its own highly elaborated set of professional norms and re179
At the
sponsibilities, standard processes, identities and culture.
175

See, e.g., 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 350 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1968) (“The true principle of government is this—make the system complete in its structure, give a perfect
proportion and balance to its parts, and the powers you give it will never affect your
security.” (quoting Alexander Hamilton)); THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 324 (James
Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (“The accumulation of all powers legislative, executive and judiciary in the same hands, whether of one, a few or many, and whether
hereditary, self appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of
tyranny.”); see also Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (“This Court
consistently has given voice to, and has reaffirmed, the central judgment of the Framers of the Constitution that, within our political scheme, the separation of governmental powers into three coordinate Branches is essential to the preservation of liberty.”); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–1787, at
549 & n.42 (1998 ed.) (citing John Jay for the proposition that separation of powers
could help avoid governmental tyranny). The unsupported assertion in Posner and
Sunstein’s article that “critics and supporters agree that changes in the global environment justify at least some expansion of executive powers,” Posner & Sunstein, supra
note 3, at 1210, is particularly striking in this regard. See, for example, infra note 261
for articles by Kim Scheppele and Martin Flaherty taking the opposite view.
176
See Pearlstein, supra note 174, at 1592 (suggesting that detention regimes, for
example, may benefit from multibranch participation).
177
Posner & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 1207.
178
Bradley, supra note 11, at 651.
179
See Deborah N. Pearlstein, Finding Effective Constraints on Executive Power: Interrogation, Detention, and Torture, 81 IND. L.J. 1255, 1274-79 (2006) (describing the American military’s “professionalism”—that is, “the institutional acquisition and maintenance of a set of technical skills, norms, and ethics”—as a “defining feature”);
Pearlstein, supra note 174, at 1608 (stating that organization theorists recognize the
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same time, the growing set of societal challenges that are counted as a
threat to “security” may swamp traditional distinctions between policy
180
that is “foreign” and “domestic.” On functional grounds alone, it is
increasingly difficult to see why the type of law per se—“foreign” or
otherwise—should make the executive’s attempts at law interpretation
more or less worthy of deference.
But it is this seeming recognition that makes it especially puzzling
that scholars such as Sunstein and Posner would embrace Chevron as a
means of ensuring that the Court attends to the views of relevant experts. As Sunstein and Posner acknowledge, “[A]n agency receives
Chevron deference even if the Administrator decides on a course of
conduct that departs from the views of her informed staff. Courts do
not look behind the agency’s process to explore who, exactly, influ181
enced the decision and to what extent.” If one accepts the view that
the executive’s key strength is its expertise on certain questions arising
in foreign relations law, one would presumably wish to insist that the
actual experts inside the executive branch be consulted. It is, as Sunstein and Posner note, the State Department—not, for example, White
House Counsel’s office—that most carefully tracks U.S. relations with
182
foreign states. Indeed, it is in part because of Chevron’s limitation in
this regard that the Court has sometimes declined to apply it, even in
the standard administrative law realm. The Court’s decision in Massa183
chusetts v. EPA, for instance, reflects this view. Declining to afford
Chevron deference to the agency’s decision not to regulate greenhouse
gas emissions, the Court emphasized the limited persuasiveness of the
agency’s reasoning. In particular, according to the Court, the EPA had
not consulted with the State Department before taking the position
“that regulating greenhouse gases might impair the President’s ability

significant benefits of “strict bureaucratic control, intense socialization, and a highly
developed sense of organizational culture” for government structures tasked with preventing high-consequence risk).
180
See U.N. SEC’Y-GEN.’S HIGH-LEVEL PANEL ON THREATS, CHALLENGES AND
CHANGE, A MORE SECURE WORLD: OUR SHARED RESPONSIBILITY, at 9, U.N. Sales No.
E.05.I.5 (2004), available at http://www.un.org/secureworld/report3.pdf (finding that
the biggest security threats facing the world now include “poverty, infectious disease
and environmental degradation”).
181
Posner & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 1214.
182
See id. at 1205 (“[T]he nature of the relationship with the foreign state, the cultural norms of that state, its legal system and other institutions, its politics, and so
forth . . . are factors followed and assessed by the Department of State.”).
183
549 U.S. 497 (2007).
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to negotiate with ‘key developing nations’ to reduce emissions.”
So,
too, it may have mattered to the Hamdan Court that the Judge Advocate
General corps of military attorneys inside the Pentagon had not engaged (and did not support) the President’s view of the necessity of mil185
itary commissions. Where expertise matters, the Court seems to recognize that there are more effective ways of ensuring its inclusion than
186
reviewing the general “reasonableness” of “executive” views per se.
The remaining functional reason for preferring Chevron in the
foreign relations setting would be if one assumed—as Chevron original187
ly appeared to —that the functional value of political accountability
is more important than any other functional value in allocating interpretive power, including that of expertise. But there is no clear reason to think accountability should be given functional superiority in
this sense. Compared to functional interests in protecting individual
rights or promoting expertise and effectiveness, political accountability has seemed a marginal concern among those functional interests
identified in the Court’s separation-of-powers jurisprudence, appear188
More to the point,
ing in dissents more often than in majorities.

184

Id. at 533-34 (citing Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. 52,922, 52,931 (Sept. 8, 2003)). The Court went on to reason,
[EPA] has offered a laundry list of reasons not to regulate. . . . Although we
have neither the expertise nor the authority to evaluate these policy judgments, it is evident they . . . [do not] amount to a reasoned justification for
declining to form a scientific judgment. . . . In the Global Climate Protection
Act of 1987, Congress authorized the State Department—not EPA—to formulate United States foreign policy with reference to environmental matters relating to climate. EPA has made no showing that it issued the ruling in question here after consultation with the State Department.
Id.
185

See Neal Kumar Katyal, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: The Legal Academy Goes to Practice,
120 HARV. L. REV. 65, 105-06 (2006) (suggesting that the Hamdan Court might have
appropriately deferred to the executive if the executive could have presented its interpretation “as the product of deliberative and sober bureaucratic decisionmaking”).
186
See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001) (finding that
courts have considered, among many factors, the agency’s relative expertise and the
“persuasiveness” of its position to decide what deference it deserves).
187
See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 866
(1984) (“[F]ederal judges—who have no constituency—have a duty to respect legitimate policy choices made by those who do.”).
188
See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 421-22 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court’s holding that the United States Sentencing Commission does not upset separation of powers is an “undemocratic precedent” that could
lead to further Congressional delegation of lawmaking to commissions that are not
accountable to the political process); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 731 (1988)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he difference is the difference that the Founders envi-
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there is some reason to think that “deference” to the executive in
some foreign relations settings will undermine, rather than enhance,
political accountability. The notion that the executive is substantially
more politically accountable than the courts may be especially ques189
Whereas in other realms
tionable in the national security context.
of administrative law it may be plausible to argue that major agency
decisions will enjoy “the kind of public scrutiny that is essential in any
190
democracy,” appropriate government interests in secrecy surrounding certain aspects of national security may make it impossible for political accountability checks to function effectively. “That is, it is precisely because security sometimes requires secrecy that the involvement
of more than one branch may be required to make popular accounta191
bility possible at all.” Taking functional interests seriously, it is thus
possible to conclude—as the Court increasingly has in traditional administrative law—that Chevron is at times too blunt an instrument for
taking those interests into account.
3. The Persistent Formal Dilemma
While functional concerns understandably tend to dominate the
question of judicial deference in foreign relations law, perhaps the
greatest challenge to the successful importation of Chevron into foreign relations law is a formal one. Chevron’s attempt to negotiate the
formal sharing of interpretive power between the courts and the executive remains one of the great unsettled debates of the modern administrative state. Indeed, as Chevron’s critics argued, when the Court
does something less than determine for itself what the law is, it is ceding interpretive power that the Framers of the Constitution intended

sioned when they established a single Chief Executive accountable to the people: the
blame can be assigned to someone who can be punished.”).
189
See Jinks & Katyal, supra note 3, at 1246 & n.58 (questioning the effectiveness of
political accountability in the foreign affairs context); Pearlstein, supra note 174, at
1575-79 (noting that the government interest in secrecy surrounding some national
security matters may make political checks on the executive that depend on transparency less effective).
190
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 190-91 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting); cf. Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245,
2331-32 (2001) (“Presidential administration promotes accountability in two principal
and related ways. First, presidential leadership enhances transparency, enabling the
public to comprehend more accurately the sources and nature of bureaucratic power.
Second, presidential leadership establishes an electoral link between the public and
the bureaucracy, increasing the latter’s responsiveness to the former.”).
191
Pearlstein, supra note 174, at 1578.
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192

to reserve to the Article III courts.
A large swath of administrative
law scholarship since Chevron has thus been occupied with explaining
how any sharing of interpretive duties is consistent with the presumed
193
first-order allocation of interpretive authority to the Article III courts.
These theories shall be considered in detail in the Part that follows.
Despite this, most scholarship arguing in favor of interpretive deference in the foreign relations context has been little troubled by
such formal concerns. This is not to suggest that there has been no
acknowledgement of Marbury v. Madison and related formal conceptions of the judicial role. To the contrary, as Curtis Bradley has usefully summarized, the “Marbury perspective” has been expressed by a
number of foreign relations law scholars, typically in objecting to deference on the basis of the executive’s functional claims of superiority
194
Yet while the passing formal asserin matters of national security.
195
tion that the judicial role is to “say what the law is” may have been a
reasonable—and reasonably stark—reply to the most expansive histor196
ical claims of executive power, it seems an insufficient account of
the role of the courts in the modern administrative state. Since Chevron in particular, the Court has, at least to some extent, shared the
job of “saying what the law is,” occasionally deferring to “reasonable”
agency interpretations in realms of administrative law hardly limited
to foreign relations. Since Hamdan especially, there can no longer be
a question that the Court intends to assert its formal power in foreign
relations law as well. Just as administrative law has had to confront
what such deference means for the modern judicial role beyond Marbury, foreign relations law must recognize that as long as the courts retain any independent interpretive authority in reviewing statutes and

192

See, e.g., Farina, supra note 17, at 525 (noting tension between Chevron’s deference regime and the judiciary’s authority to determine statutory meaning).
193
See infra Part II.
194
Bradley, supra note 11, at 650 & n.2 (“[C]ommentators [who express the ‘Marbury perspective’] typically frame [the issue of deference in foreign affairs cases] as a
choice between two extremes: either the courts in foreign affairs cases enforce the
‘rule of law’ against the Executive or they abdicate their judicial function.”) (citing,
inter alia, FRANCK, supra note 38, at 4-5 (1992), and HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR
148 (1990)); see also generally Alex Glashausser, Difference and Deference in Treaty Interpretation, 50 VILL. L. REV. 25 (2005) (opposing deference to the executive’s interpretation
of treaties on formal grounds).
195
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
196
See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936)
(describing the President as the “sole organ of the federal government in the field of
international relations”).
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treaties, there must be a theory of the “judicial power”—and an associated doctrine of deference, vel non—that explains how the interpretive role may be shared.
While embracing the administrative law model in many respects,
and indeed suggesting that the Court extend Chevron so that it might
defer to the executive’s interpretation in foreign relations cases even
when the underlying law is not ambiguous, Sunstein and Posner offer
only passing formal defense of their argument. To the extent that
they address formal constraints, Sunstein and Posner note that any
legislative “grant of authority to the executive in the domain of for197
eign affairs ought generally to include a power of interpretation.”
Presumably, the authors mean that the Court should construe any
treaty or foreign relations statute as implicitly delegating interpretive
power. Yet such a delegation theory faces several hurdles. For example, it is not at all clear what “interpretive” power Congress has to delegate, as the Court has regularly drawn lines between the constitu198
tional function of lawmaking and law interpreting. Congress surely
possesses the former, but not so obviously the latter. Indeed, it is for
this reason that the more persuasive formal explanation for Chevron
has been one that understands Congress as having delegated lawmaking power to the agencies (whether that delegation is express or im199
plied). As long as this is the case, executive agencies engaged in the
business of statutory construction in the course of implementing Congress’s instructions need not intrude on the judicial power at all; they
197

Posner & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 1198.
See South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 355 (1998) (“We have
often observed, however, that ‘the views of a subsequent Congress form a hazardous
basis for inferring the intent of an earlier one.’” (quoting United States v. Phila. Nat’l
Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 348-49 (1963))); Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496
U.S. 633, 650 (1990) (“[S]ubsequent legislative history is a ‘hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier’ Congress.” (quoting United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304,
313 (1960))); see also Cent. Bank of Denver, N. A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver,
N. A., 511 U.S. 164, 185 (1994) (“‘[W]e have observed on more than one occasion that
the interpretation given by one Congress . . . to an earlier statute is of little assistance
in discerning the meaning of that statute.’” (quoting Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys. of Ohio v.
Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 168 (1989))); United States v. Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 170
(1968) (“[T]he views of one Congress as to the construction of a statute adopted many
years before by another Congress have ‘very little, if any, significance.’” (quoting Rainwater v. United States, 356 U.S. 590, 593 (1958))).
199
See Monaghan, supra note 24 at 25-26 (“Judicial deference to agency ‘interpretation’ of law is simply one way of recognizing a delegation of law-making authority to
an agency.” (emphasis omitted)); see also United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218,
226-27 (2001) (“[A]dministrative implementation of a particular statutory provision
qualifies for Chevron deference when it appears that Congress delegated authority to
the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law . . . .”).
198

PEARLSTEIN REVISED FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

824

2/3/2011 11:53 AM

[Vol. 159: 783

are acting only as a more detail-oriented extension of Congress itself.
The notion that executive agencies post-Chevron are carrying out a
core judicial function of law interpretation would present a far greater
challenge to the formal judicial power than Sunstein and Posner’s
thesis appears to contemplate. In an era when the delegation doctrine, long thought dead, continues to find judicial support in various
200
forms, the authors’ proposed solution risks the criticism that their
functional cure will kill the formal patient.
Importing Chevron into the foreign relations setting without attempting to address the question of judicial power only perpetuates
the formal interpretive debate. Particularly because the formal allocation of foreign relations power between the judicial and executive
branches—unlike the more novel authority of administrative agencies—is a subject of express constitutional concern, it seems essential
to have a formal theory of how interpretive power may be shared in
this realm before designing a deference doctrine that effectively
shares it. Once a “case or controversy” is properly before an Article III
court, is there a formal floor of judicial power to interpret statutes and
treaties, beneath which no functional deference rationale can allow
the Court to sink? The remainder of the Article explores answers to
this question of formal power in an attempt to shed light on which
non-Chevron approach is appropriate.
II. CONSIDERING FORMAL THEORIES OF THE JUDICIAL POWER
The text of Article III of the Constitution is notoriously short on
elaboration of what, precisely, is contained in the “judicial power of
200

For example, in Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, the Court gave voice to
delegation concerns in rejecting the notion that an agency could cure an unlawful delegation of legislative power by giving the statute a narrow construction. See 531 U.S.
457, 473 (2001) (“The very choice of which portion of the power to exercise—that is to
say, the prescription of the standard that Congress had omitted—would itself be an exercise of the forbidden legislative authority. Whether the statute delegates legislative
power is a question for the courts, and an agency’s voluntary self-denial has no bearing
upon the answer.”). Beyond this, there seems broad agreement that nondelegation
concerns continue to manifest themselves in interpretive canons against delegation.
See infra note 238 (discussing the nondelegation canon). There also remain periodic
signs elsewhere that the Court has retained an interest in policing formal structural
constraints. Since Chevron, the Court has continued to produce decisions insisting that
formal lines are drawn between and among the branches. See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar,
478 U.S. 714, 732-34 (1986) (rejecting a statute through which Congress vested executive powers in an agency official but reserved for itself the power to remove him from
office); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983) (invalidating the so-called legislative
veto of executive agency action).
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201

the United States.” Chief Justice John Marshall’s attempt in Marbury
202
v. Madison to put flesh on the bare bones of this power made some
of its features clear, but arguably obscured others. While Marbury famously established that it was “the province and duty of the judicial
203
department to say what the law is,” it also suggested that there were
some executive actions that might not be amenable to judicial invali204
dation. Moreover, while Marbury is understood to focus on why it is
appropriate for the Court not only to engage in, but also to assert su205
premacy over, constitutional interpretation, the opinion devotes not a
moment to justifying the Court’s power to interpret the acts of Congress also at issue in the case.
In some respects, this relative inattention makes sense. Judicial
interpretation of subconstitutional law arguably raises fewer concerns
about the legitimacy of the judiciary, as it lacks the finality, and therefore the supremacy, associated with constitutional interpretation. If
the regular democratic process has some capacity to fix any judicial
mistake in the interpretation of a statute or treaty, then one need not
worry as much about finding a democratic justification for judicial
power. Yet it is still necessary to define the contours of the judicial
power to interpret statutes and treaties to understand when the Court
can decline to exercise its power or otherwise share power with
another branch to interpret the law in cases properly before it. Largely in response to this need, presented most acutely by the rise of modern administrative law, scholars have explored a series of theories
based variously on constitutional text and original meaning, as well as
public choice and democratic theory, to explain why and to what extent judges have the power to say what subconstitutional law means.

201

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
203
Id. at 177.
204
See id. at 165-66 (“By the constitution of the United States, the President is invested with certain important political powers, in the exercise of which he is to use his
own discretion, and is accountable only to his country in his political character, and to
his own conscience. To aid him in the performance of these duties, he is authorized to
appoint certain officers, who act by his authority and in conformity with his orders. In
such cases, their acts are his acts; and whatever opinion may be entertained of the
manner in which executive discretion may be used, still there exists, and can exist, no
power to control that discretion. The subjects are political. They respect the nation,
not individual rights, and being entrusted to the executive, the decision of the executive is conclusive.”).
205
See, e.g., KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 2 (2007) (“[Marbury v. Madison asserted] a strong claim to judicial authority over
the interpretation of constitutional meaning.”).
202
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This Part reviews the two leading accounts of judicial interpretive power: faithful agent theory and what is often called instrumental theory.
It concludes that while each account is instructive—and instrumental
theory especially useful—neither ultimately seems sufficient for understanding the judicial role in interpreting foreign relations law.
A. Faithful Agent Theory
Likely still the dominant understanding of the courts’ role in statutory interpretation, “faithful agent” theory sees the relationship between Congress and the courts as that of principal and agent, where
the agent’s duty is limited to discerning and applying the directions of
206
the principal set forth in statute. As a theory of the judicial power,
faithful agent theory has obvious attractions. The notion that judges
act only as translators for the democratically elected legislature helps
to address perennial concerns about the countermajoritarianism of an
unelected federal judiciary. Indeed, the historical argument in favor
of this view, set forth in detail by John Manning, contends that faithful
agent theory is most consistent with the Constitution’s structural efforts (driven in part by response to Anti-Federalist concerns) to address the countermajoritarian problem by limiting judicial discre207
tion. Among other structural features, the Constitution’s insistence
upon bicameralism and presentment made it “difficult to imagine that
the Founders designed an elaborate method of legislation, while si-

206

See, e.g., John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 TEX. L.
REV. 113, 116 (1998) (“[L]egislators are the lawgivers . . . [and so] courts deciding statutory cases are bound to follow commands and policies embodied in the enacted
text—commands and policies the courts did not create and cannot change.”); Richard
A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179, 189 (1986) (“In our system of government the framers of statutes . . . are the superiors of the judges. The framers communicate orders
to the judges through legislative texts . . . . If the orders are clear, the judges must obey
them.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV.
405, 415 (1989) (“According to the most prominent conception of the role of courts in
statutory construction, judges are agents or servants of the legislature. . . . The judicial
task is to discern and apply a judgment made by others, most notably the legislature.”);
Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History and the Interpretation of Statutes: Toward a FactFinding Model of Statutory Interpretation, 76 VA. L. REV. 1295, 1313 (1990) (“Traditional
democratic theory suggests that the court interpreting a statute must act as the faithful
agent of the legislature’s intent.”).
207
See John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV.
1, 85 (2001) (arguing that in debates leading up to the Constitution’s ratification, the
Federalists invoked the faithful agent notion to counter Anti-Federalist concerns).
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multaneously granting judges broad independent authority to alter
208
the results outside that carefully constructed process.”
In Manning’s account, the founding-era Marshall Court recognized the limited nature of the judicial role in this regard: “[I]t has
truly been stated to be the duty of the court to effect the intention of
209
the legislature.” This view led the Court away from the common law
practice of equitable interpretation—construing otherwise-clear statutory texts to avoid injustice or to remedy textual gaps that seemed in210
consistent with legislative policy. Moreover, Manning argues, to the
extent the Court ever departed from the import of a plain text—by
applying a substantive canon of interpretation, for example—such
departures could be understood as necessary to fulfill the legislative
211
The canons of constitutional avoidance or of guarding
intent.
against excessive delegations of power, for example, may “acquire a
sort of prescriptive validity, since the legislature presumably has them
212
in mind when it chooses its language.”
Yet faithful agent theory in other respects struggles to explain the
use or value of such substantive canons—driven by extralegislative
values—or the related use of clear statement canons, in which the
Court requires a clear statement from Congress before interpreting a
statute, for example, to infringe on state sovereignty or delegate excessive authority to another branch. Presumably, the theory could not
tolerate the use of such canons to trump a reading of a statute whose
textual meaning is otherwise plain. It likewise requires some explanation to understand how faithful agent theory could survive an executive
deference doctrine like Chevron, which seemingly allows an executive
agency to supplant the Court as the interpretive agent of Congress. Indeed, for the faithful agent understanding to work, Chevron must be
understood not as a doctrine of judicial deference to executive authority,
but rather as a doctrine of congressional authority alone. That is, when

208

Id. at 71.
Id. at 91 (quoting Schooner Paulina’s Cargo v. United States, 11 U.S. (7
Cranch) 52, 60 (1812)).
210
Id. at 92.
211
Id. at 95-101.
212
Antonin Scalia, Assorted Canards of Contemporary Legal Analysis, 40 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 581, 583 (1990); see also John F. Manning, Lessons from a Nondelegation Canon, 83
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1541, 1553 (2008) (“‘A legislator who votes for . . . a provision . . . does so on the assumption that . . . what the words mean to him is identical to
what they will mean to those to whom they are addressed . . . .’” (quoting Jeremy Waldron, Legislators’ Intentions and Unintentional Legislation, in LAW AND INTERPRETATION
329, 339 (Andrei Marmor ed., 1995))).
209
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the Court defers to an interpretation by an executive agency, it is deferring only because Congress has delegated the agency the authority of
213
an adjunct legislature. In this sense, the Court shows no deference at
all to the executive, but rather just to the legislature-by-proxy.
Beyond the vigorous criticism to which faithful agent theory has
214
been subject on historical and other grounds, the theory for this
reason seems particularly ill-suited to illuminate the judicial task of
statutory interpretation in foreign relations law. Indeed, it is not clear
that the theory leaves room for an executive interpretive role of any
sort. Consider the faithful agent understanding of Chevron deference—an understanding that depends on an assessment of the executive’s superior political accountability as Congress’s delegated
lawmaker. Yet political accountability (whether the agency is understood to be either a legislative delegate or part of an appropriately political executive administration) has only been part of the rationale for
doctrines like Chevron. The other part—one central to the foreign relations context—is the notion that the executive possesses expertise
that the Court may be wise to take into account, whether or not the
legislature believes that it should. In this regard, it seems especially
difficult to reconcile a view of the Court as a faithful agent to Congress
with the expectation in foreign relations law that the executive’s views
have at least some functional relevance to the task of law interpreta215
tion, whether or not Congress thinks they should.
Using faithful agent theory to explain the judicial power in treaty
interpretation is even more suspect. In the Manning vision, limiting the
Court’s role to that of faithful agent is necessary to preserve the integrity of the Framers’ scheme that laws would be made only with bicameral
approval and after presentment to the executive. Treaties, of course,
213

See Monaghan, supra note 24, at 26 (“Judicial deference to agency ‘interpretation’ of law is simply one way of recognizing a delegation of law-making authority to an
agency.” (emphasis omitted)).
214
See William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Words: Early Understandings of the “Judicial
Power” in Statutory Interpretation, 1776–1806, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 990, 997 (2001) (“[T]he
original materials surrounding Article III’s judicial power assume an eclectic approach to
statutory interpretation, open to understanding the letter of a statute in pursuance of the
spirit of the law and in light of fundamental values.”); Molot, supra note 21, at 73 (suggesting that Chevron deference renders “[statutory] interpretation a political process”).
215
Faithful agent theory may be subject to attack on formal grounds as well, at
least from those who conceive of the “executive power” in the foreign relations realm
as carrying significant interpretive authority of its own. See, e.g., Sunstein, Beyond Marbury, supra note 11, at 2595 (suggesting that interpreting unclear terms in a foreign
relations context may require deference to executive interpretation). This Article returns to such claims in Part III.
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emerge from a formally different place, with the treaty-making power
residing in the executive, but only “by and with the Advice and Consent
216
of the Senate.” At a minimum, the constitutional text would seem to
give the executive some claim to a shared, but nonetheless formal, role
in “making” the treaty law. Indeed, excluding all evidence of executive
views in treaty making seems likely to diminish the accuracy of any judicial interpretation. Moreover, even if the Senate and executive were
the sole lawmakers involved in treaty making, the absence of House participation in treaty ratification weakens the argument that faithful agent
theory helps preserve bicameral or democratic decisionmaking in any
pure sense. In any case, the executive and Senate are not the sole lawmakers involved in making treaties; foreign treaty partners help conceive, negotiate, and draft the legal text. In this context, it is a mistake
to view the U.S. government or any of its branches as the sole “princip217
al” lawmaker whose intent the Court must discern.
Perhaps more significantly, a faithful agent view of treaty interpretation is inconsistent with an important theme in the Court’s historical
approach to treaty interpretation, one that understands the judicial task
as in part akin to contract interpretation, in which the intent that must
218
be discerned is that of the treaty parties. In this regard, the claim that
the Court regularly defers to executive views on the meaning of treaties
219
obscures more than it clarifies. It is true that the Court has on occasion invoked rhetoric that the views of “the departments of government
particularly charged with [treaty] negotiation and enforcement” are
220
due “great weight.” Yet, as the Court noted in the case first invoking
the “great weight” standard and since, the weight may be accorded not
only to the views of the executive but to those of all the parties that ne221
gotiated the treaty. To the extent that the Court has attended to the
executive’s views, it is more regularly to the views of both negotiating
partners as evidence of negotiating intent and of post-ratification performance. In this context, understanding the Court to be an “agent” of
the parties seems jarring at best.

216

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s focus on
the interpretations of foreign treaty parties, in addition to those of the United States).
218
See Sullivan v. Kidd, 254 U.S. 433, 439 (1921) (“Writers of authority agree that
treaties are to be interpreted upon the principles which govern the interpretation of
contracts in writing between individuals . . . .”).
219
See supra Section I.A (citing scholars advancing this view).
220
Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 194 (1961).
221
See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
217
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B. Instrumental Interpretation
A second model of the judicial power, sometimes called instrumental theory, holds that Article III courts were not created to be mere
agents of Congress. Rather, the courts were meant to employ quintessentially judicial canons of interpretation and methods of legal reasoning that would help both to clarify ambiguous texts and to influence
222
legislative drafting over time.
One of the most thorough recent accounts of this view comes from Jonathan Molot. He contends that the
Framers understood judicial reasoning to be at least moderately constrained on its own terms by judicial principles such as stare decisis and
by interpretive canons that drove courts to avoid absurd or unjust re223
sults. In this view, courts bring to bear institutional and professional
norms to help serve rule-of-law interests in consistency, fairness, justice,
and rationality across the law—in order to “induce legislators to inter224
nalize these judicial values when enacting statutes in the first place.”
Such interests were less likely to be reflected in legislation if the law’s
content was left only to the pull of political constituencies, driven by
225
Moreover, independent
their own specific and immediate needs.
judicial interpretation of statutes could prompt further public engagement with gaps in statutory meaning, whether the gap results from
226
In this
legislative inadvertence or a failure of political compromise.
222

See, e.g., ESKRIDGE, supra note 21, at 117-18 (noting that the Framers expected
judges both to “interpret statutes equitably” and to interpret statutes contrary to the
legislature’s expectations, thereby requiring the legislature to examine the full impact
of its enactments); Molot, supra note 21, at 3 & n.2 (describing the “instrumentalist”
approach and citing scholarly analyses).
223
See Molot, supra note 21, at 34-38 (discussing the interpretive tools that the
Framers believed were available to the judiciary to discern legislative intent).
224
Id. at 42.
225
According to Molot,
the prospect of judicial interpretation could provide just the ammunition that
a legislator might need to defeat an unjust or irrational political compromise.
A legislator might speak in opposition to a proposal that benefits one group at
the expense of another, for example, not simply because the provision is unjust or irrational, but also because judges would likely construe the proposed
provision more strictly than they would an alternative version that benefits
both groups. Regardless of the individual legislator’s true motive, the judicial
perspective would be wielded in favor of fairness and consistency in the legislative process.
Id. at 48 (footnote omitted). See also Molot, supra note 141, at 1301 (“[J]udges nonetheless strive for stability and consistency over time in a way that political officials do not.”).
226
Molot describes the judiciary’s role as follows:
When the judiciary draws boundaries between legislative enactments and executive leeway, it provides a benchmark for deliberation in the political
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sense, courts’ transparent exercise of the interpretive function could
also serve a democracy-forcing function, helping to clarify the law (and
thereby to promote the rule of law) over time.
Much in an instrumentalist theory of judicial power seems salient
in foreign relations law. On formal grounds, there is the promise that
judicial involvement could help reinforce a structural constitutional
scheme that contemplates Congress and the executive sharing power
227
in foreign relations. Although the Constitution grants Congress any
number of broad textual powers that seem to contemplate its en228
gagement in and regulation of U.S. foreign affairs, scholars have
long lamented Congress’s cession of power to the executive on many
questions of foreign relations. This phenomenon may derive from
political dynamics that tend to give the executive disproportionate political credit for engagement in foreign relations successes, while ensuring that both political branches are blamed for foreign relations
229
failures. But whether Congress’s reticence is driven by constitutional conviction or political fear (or some other institutional failing), it
process. It tells legislators what they must do to bind administrators and tells
citizens what they must do to comply with legislative instructions. By providing such a backdrop for public officials and private citizens, judicial interpretation tends to reinforce legislative authority and the rule of law.
Molot, supra note 141, at 1317.
227
See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY 54-56 (1993) (suggesting
that the courts should induce Congress to check a presidential decision to go to war);
KOH, supra note 194, at 123-32 (discussing congressional acquiescence to the executive’s foreign policy initiatives in the wake of Cold War conflicts); ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 58-60 (1973) (chronicling the early erosion of
the legislative check on executive war powers).
228
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (giving Congress the power, inter alia, to declare war,
define and punish offenses against the law of nations, and raise and support armies).
229
See THEODORE J. LOWI & BENJAMIN GINSBERG, AMERICAN GOVERNMENT: FREEDOM AND POWER 289-93 (1990) (describing the effects of executive action vis-à-vis foreign policy on presidential approval ratings); THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM 146 (2d ed. 1979) (“If the president can revive his major resource, his public
following, with almost any international act with which he can clearly associate himself,
then he must always be under some pressure to prefer such actions.”). As Justice Jackson put it with characteristic eloquence:
I have no illusion that any decision by this Court can keep power in the hands
of Congress if it is not wise and timely in meeting its problems. A crisis that
challenges the President equally, or perhaps primarily, challenges Congress.
If not good law, there was worldly wisdom in the maxim attributed to Napoleon that “The tools belong to the man who can use them.” We may say that
power to legislate for emergencies belongs in the hands of Congress, but only
Congress itself can prevent power from slipping through its fingers.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 654 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
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may be prompted into action by judicial insistence that Congress
reengage in matters of foreign relations.
Indeed, Congress has demonstrated its capacity to respond when
230
it dislikes the interpretive efforts of the Court. The question about
the legality of executive-made military commissions as a forum for war
crimes trials in Hamdan is only a more recent example. The issue in
Hamdan revolved around the President’s authorization of the use of
231
For five years thereafter, Conmilitary commissions in late 2001.
gress remained silent while the executive branch made repeated efforts to refine the commission structure in the face of vigorous objections. The Court’s 2006 decision in Hamdan—holding, inter alia, that
the President lacked the authority to convene such commissions with232
out express congressional authorization —compelled the executive
to seek engagement by Congress. Congress thus entered a heated public debate on the question and ultimately passed a detailed statute au233
While the resulting Milithorizing the use of military commissions.
tary Commissions Act of 2006 may be criticized on various levels, there
is little question that it was the Court’s engagement that forced serious
legislative consideration of the parameters of commission trials. In this
regard, judicial involvement promoted the structural value of political
accountability: the Court’s action forced a transparent debate in Congress, rather than leaving the resolution of core questions of meaning
to far less transparent executive branch processes, where secrecy may
readily disable accountability checks.
There is also much to be said about the utility of judicial pressure
on the political branches to clarify foreign relations law and legal texts
over time. Consider recent judicial efforts to interpret the AUMF,
which Congress enacted in the wake of the attacks of September 11,
234
Given the relatively sparse legislative history and other stan2001.
230

See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 339 &
n.115 (2000) (noting that Congress will legislate in response to judicial decisions); see
also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions,
101 YALE L.J. 331 (1991) (discussing the phenomenon).
231
See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 594-95 (2006) (stating that the
Court’s task was to determine whether presidential authorization of military commissions was justified).
232
See id. at 612-13 (“These simply are not the circumstances in which . . . a military commission established by Executive Order . . . may lawfully try a person and subject him to punishment.”).
233
Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified
as amended at 10, 18, 28 and 42 U.S.C.).
234
See Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224
(2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note (2006)).
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dard interpretive sources that usually help courts discern the meaning
of statutes, some scholars have suggested that historical executive
branch practice should be explored to shed light on statutory mean235
If the President has interpreted force-authorization language
ing.
one way in the past—and especially if Congress has acquiesced in that
interpretation over time—then a later Congress could employ the
same language comfortable in the knowledge that executive imple236
mentation would accurately reflect its intent.
Yet, as the Court itself has recognized, reliance on acquiescence to
past practice is fraught with problems that range from functional concerns about interpreting legislative silence to formal problems of according the same authority to congressional silences as to congressional legislation that has satisfied the important hurdles of bicameral
237
In the foreign relations
debate and presentment to the executive.
context, it may be especially unclear whether a particular executive
action is taken pursuant to an executive understanding of statutory
delegation, or based on the executive’s view of its own constitutional
authority. And particularly if one believes modern security threats are
categorically different from past dangers, it is not at all evident that
past executive practice offers clarification in this realm. In contrast, a
legislature acting in the shadow of clearer judicial expectations—or
any guidance—in drafting statutes might facilitate legislative use-offorce debates, crystallizing differences in circumstances when prompt
resolution may be important.
While adopting an instrumental theory of judicial power in foreign relations law may thus have considerable advantages, a purely instrumental view of structural judicial power leaves open some important questions for deference doctrine in foreign relations. A first set
of questions goes to the permissibility of deference of any kind to executive views in statutory interpretation. The instrumentalist court’s
duty to ensure that legislative drafting is informed by rule-of-law values
would seem to preclude much attention to executive views at any
stage. Limiting judicial engagement in the interpretation of legal
questions properly before the courts would curtail the infusion into
235

See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 23, at 2085-88 (noting that “[c]ourts often
rely on past Executive Branch practice to inform the meaning of a federal statute”).
236
See id. at 2085.
237
See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REV. 67, 91
(1988) (“For every case where the Court rhapsodizes about deliberative inaction, there is
a counter-case subjecting such inferences to scathing critique. ‘To explain the cause of
non-action by Congress when Congress itself sheds no light is to venture into speculative
unrealities’ . . . .” (quoting Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119-20 (1940))).
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lawmaking of judicial values that instrumentalists would maintain the
Framers expected the courts to promote. Instrumental theory might
well tolerate judicial consideration of executive views (short of legal
deference) for functional reasons—a Skidmore-like attention to the
formal process, relative expertise, and persuasiveness of the executive’s position. But it is difficult to see instrumental theory as readily
reconcilable with even Chevron—much less Curtiss-Wright—deference
to executive views. If instrumental theory as such is right, superdeference regimes are likely wrong.
Perhaps more importantly, instrumental theory leaves central
questions about the relationship between the interpretive power of
the courts and the executive unanswered. In particular, it does little
to resolve the role of substantive canons of statutory construction,
which faithful agent theory at least explains as fair inferences of legis238
lative intent. Would instrumental theory tolerate, require, or forbid
an avoidance canon that requires a clear legislative statement before
rendering an interpretation that has the effect of delegating power
239
The instrumentalist court fulfills its
from one branch to another?
duty, it seems, by promoting clarity in the law to serve general interests in fairness and the rule of law. In this regard, any weight executive views may carry could sway judicial decisionmaking, even if the
executive’s interpretation ran afoul of one of these substantive canons. Particularly in foreign relations law, where it has been argued
that nondelegation canons, for example, may have less salience in the
240
face of the executive’s formal constitutional authority, it seems important to understand whether part of the judicial power requires the
Court to police substantive commitments, as well as interpretive ones.
238

The nondelegation canon disfavors interpretations that would transfer significant swaths of discretionary power from one branch to another. Likewise, the canon
of constitutional avoidance instructs the Court to disfavor readings that would threaten
rights protected by the Constitution. Often invoked in the form of a clear statement
requirement, such canons provide that the Court shall not construe a statute to infringe on constitutional rights or delegate significant power without a clear statement
to that effect in the legal text. These canons may prove dispositive in resolving the
meaning of a subconstitutional text. See Kenneth A. Bamberger, Normative Canons in
the Review of Administrative Policymaking, 118 YALE L. J. 64, 79-80 (2008) (arguing that
these canons allow courts to constrain congressional action).
239
A number of scholars have discussed the role of so-called normative canons in
statutory interpretation. See, e.g., Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 22, at 598 (“A good many
of the substantive canons of statutory construction are directly inspired by the Constitution . . . .”); Sunstein, supra note 22, at 2111 (“By using these principles, courts decide
cases of statutory meaning by reference to something external to legislative desires . . . .”).
240
See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 23, at 2103-06 (arguing against a clear
statement requirement on delegation grounds in interpreting the AUMF).
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Instrumental theory, likewise, seems a partial description at best
of the Court’s role in treaty interpretation. It is hard to believe that
the judicial power in treaty interpretation hinges on the expectation
that interpretive values pursued by the U.S. judiciary alone are
meant to have a clear impact on treaty drafting over time. After all,
Congress does not hold the treaty-drafting pen, or it holds it only in
an indirect way. While the executive certainly has some incentive to
take Supreme Court interpretive expectations into account in negotiating treaty texts, in multilateral treaty negotiations, the United
States is but one judicial system among many. Foreign courts are
hardly bound by the interpretive guidance of the U.S. Supreme
Court, and treaty partners have their own domestic interpretive de241
mands to fulfill. Under the circumstances, it would be surprising if
instrumental influences of this sort were the primary expected judicial function in treaty interpretation.
The Supreme Court has a long history of vigorous engagement in
treaty interpretation, beginning aggressively in the era of the found242
ing of the United States. But if not as faithful agent, and if not with
purely instrumental goals in mind, what is the Court’s understanding
of its role in interpreting treaties? Put differently, what is the nature of
the judicial power such that it extends to foreign relations law at all?
III. EXPLORING A FORMAL THEORY OF JUDICIAL POWER FOR
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
Given the seeming inadequacies of primary theories of the judicial
interpretive power to address the standard challenges of foreign relations law, the final part of this Article begins to explore theoretical
frameworks that might avoid the failures of faithful agent theory in
241

The 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, setting forth detailed
rules for the interpretation of treaties, has been ratified by 110 nations. See Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 20. The United States has signed but
not ratified the treaty. Id. Nonetheless, the U.S. Department of State has on occasion
acknowledged the Vienna Convention as “the authoritative guide to current treaty law
and practice.” RICHARD K. GARDINER, TREATY INTERPRETATION 134 (2008) (quoting
Chubb & Son, Inc. v. Asiana Airlines, 214 F.3d 301, 308 (2d Cir. 2000)). The U.S. Supreme Court has not seemed much interested in the Vienna approach since the treaty
entered into force in 1980. See id. at 133-38 (analyzing whether the Supreme Court’s
treaty-interpretation practice diverges from the Vienna rules).
242
See David Sloss, Judicial Deference to Executive Branch Treaty Interpretations: A Historical Perspective, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 497, 498-99 (2007) (noting that the U.S. government won less than twenty percent of cases between 1789 and 1838 in which a treaty
was the basis of a claim or defense); see also supra subsection I.A.1 (reviewing multiple
cases in which the Court asserted independent authority to interpret treaty obligations).
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this realm and fill in the gaps left by purely instrumental approaches.
Here called equilibrium theory, this emerging model draws both on
traditional justifications for judicial supremacy in constitutional interpretation and on scholars’ attempts to reconcile formal notions of the
separation of powers with the advent of the administrative state. In
brief, the claim is that part of the judicial power is to promote the separation of powers. This Part first introduces the basic idea. It then
considers the principal objection to the approach: in particular, the
formal claim that the executive has its own interpretive power that
must be taken into account in any understanding of shared interpretive authority. Throughout, this Part considers what such a view of the
judicial duty would contribute to our understanding of deference in
current dilemmas in statutory and treaty interpretation.
A. Equilibrium Theory
It is hardly new to suggest that the Supreme Court has a role to
play in preventing the accrual of excessive power in any one branch of
the federal government. Such a duty has been understood to emerge
from a range of constitutional sources, from general principles of the
separation of powers to specific guarantees of individual rights in the
243
text. Indeed, the argument that it is a core judicial function to police structural boundaries to constrain power is a central justification
of Marbury itself:
This original and supreme will organizes the government, and assigns, to
different departments, their respective powers. It may either stop here;
or establish certain limits not to be transcended by those departments.
The government of the United States is of the latter description. The
powers of the legislature are defined, and limited; and that those limits
may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written. To what
purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose is that limitation com-

243

See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 473 (2001) (“The very
choice of which portion of the power to exercise—that is to say, the prescription of the
standard that Congress had omitted—would itself be an exercise of the forbidden legislative authority. Whether the statute delegates legislative power is a question for the
courts, and an agency’s voluntary self-denial has no bearing upon the answer.”); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (“This Court consistently has given
voice to, and has reaffirmed, the central judgment of the Framers of the Constitution
that, within our political scheme, the separation of governmental powers into three
coordinate Branches is essential to the preservation of liberty.”); Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 322 (1946) (“Courts and their procedural safeguards are indispensable to our system of government. They were set up by our founders to protect
the liberties they valued.”).
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mitted to writing, if these limits may, at any time, be passed by those intended to be restrained? The distinction, between a government with
limited and unlimited powers, is abolished, if those limits do not confine
the persons on whom they are imposed, and if acts prohibited and acts
244
allowed, are of equal obligation.

Of significance here, Marbury’s message in this regard is not limited to constitutional interpretation but extends to statutory and trea245
ty interpretation as well. This understanding should be unremarkable. The text of Article III makes it clear that the “judicial power”
extends without distinction to the Constitution, statutes, and trea246
ties. It is not immediately apparent why that power, to the extent it
includes any interpretive authority, would not be exercised in largely
the same way from one instrument to the next.
To the extent modern scholars have challenged Marbury’s conception of judicial power in this regard—and challenged it they have—
their concerns have focused principally on the particular dilemma of
constitutional interpretation. The contemporary constitutional theory
commonly labeled “departmentalism,” for instance, holds that “each
branch, or department, of government has an equal authority to interpret the Constitution in the context of conducting its duties” and
247
“is supreme within its own interpretive sphere.” Drawing on textual,
structural, and historical claims to shared interpretive authority, departmentalists have advanced a range of reasons the political branches
should be understood to have at least some power to interpret for
themselves the meaning of the Constitution, including its structural
248
For these scholars, the principal objection to
grants of authority.
244

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176-77 (1803); see also N. Pipeline
Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 58 (1982) (“The Federal Judiciary
was therefore designed by the Framers to stand independent of the Executive and Legislature—to maintain the checks and balances of the constitutional structure . . . .”),
superseded by statute, Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub.
L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333.
245
See Monaghan, supra note 24, at 2 (“Marshall’s grand conception of judicial
autonomy in law declaration was not in terms or in logic limited to constitutional
interpretation . . . .”).
246
See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases . . . arising under this Constitution, laws of the United States, and Treaties
made . . . .”).
247
Keith E. Whittington, Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation: Three Objections
and Responses, 80 N.C. L. REV. 773, 782-83 (2002).
248
See, e.g., LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES 105-10 (2004) (noting that
departmentalism squares with founding-era ideas about “popular constitutionalism”);
MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 6-32 (1999) (arguing against judicial supremacy in constitutional interpretation); WHITTINGTON, su-
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Marbury’s assumption of judicial supremacy is the countermajoritarian
one: of all branches, why should the nondemocratic Court have the
power to say what our democratic Constitution means, particularly as
it is so difficult to amend the Constitution democractically (as the
Constitution itself provides)? Why should the Court be allowed effectively to end the debate on constitutional meaning?
For reasons that should be apparent, judicial interpretation of statutes and treaties poses less troubling democratic concerns. If Congress does not like the Court’s interpretation of a statute, whether
based on a substantive canon of interpretation or on some other reason, it can pass another one. If Congress does not like the Court’s interpretation of a treaty, it can pass a subsequent statute, effectively
249
overturning whatever interpretation the Court has given the treaty.
Indeed, as instrumental theories of judicial power suggest, judicial interpretation of statutes and treaties can serve an eminently democratic
function, not only by compelling the lawmaker to clarify meaning
through a public and deliberative process, but also by infusing laws
250
Such a function is
with judicial values of stability and consistency.
likely to be particularly valuable in certain foreign relations contexts,
where executive branch secrecy can challenge the effectiveness of
congressional oversight.
For statutes and treaties, then, the more significant challenge to
the Marbury view of interpretive authority—a view that assumes some
judicial role in limiting government power—is less a question of which
single branch should play the role of interbranch enforcer. Instead, it
is the challenge of identifying what those formal authorities are, or
could be, in the modern administrative state. If executive agencies
are to carry out both quasi-legislative and quasi-adjudicative functions,
then an interpretation of Marbury (or anything else) that would contemplate the enforcement by any branch of a strictly formal division of
pra note 205, at 30 (noting that Presidents Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln, Roosevelt, and
Reagan articulated departmentalist views); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous
Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 223 (1994) (arguing
that the veto, pardon, and appointment powers, among others, reflect the executive’s
broad mandate to interpret the Constitution); Cornelia T.L. Pillard, The Unfulfilled
Promise of the Constitution in Executive Hands, 103 MICH. L. REV. 676, 687 (2005) (“[T]he
Constitution’s grant of executive power, together with the duty faithfully to execute
the laws, means that the executive and Congress acting in their own spheres must interpret and apply the Constitution.”); Whittington, supra note 247, at 783 n.42 (noting
that the concept of departmentalism arose in debates among the Founders).
249
See HENKIN, supra note 4, at 209 & nn.129-31 (describing the ability of legislation to supersede treaty provisions).
250
See supra Section II.B (discussing instrumental interpretation in further detail).
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powers—executive power to the executive, legislative power to Congress, and so forth—cannot survive.
Yet the notion that federal power may be effectively limited only
by, for example, preventing the executive from issuing any kind of
legal rule (lest it be accused of legislating) was not necessarily the
separation-of-powers concept the Framers had in mind or the limit
Marbury itself necessarily contemplated. Rather, as Cynthia Farina
noted in the wake of Chevron, the Madisonian vision of separated
powers was of a government of shared authority, with each branch
possessing enough constitutional power “to resist encroachments of
251
Allowing one branch to accrue functional authority
the others.”
over time in the service of effective governance was thus permissible
as long as the other branches could respond with equal and opposite
constraining forces of their own. Delegation of legislative power to
the executive could be tolerated under this scheme, as long as it remained possible to maintain an offsetting power through indepen252
dent judicial interpretation. In this respect, the problem with Chevron was that it disabled that system of “dynamic equilibrium,”
depriving the courts of their full power of interpretation just when
253
the need to preserve equilibrium was greatest.
If this view of the modern consequences of Marbury is correct—
that is, the view that part of the judicial role is to help maintain interbranch equilibrium—it holds several implications for statutory and
treaty interpretation that make it a useful supplement to an instrumental approach. First, like instrumental theory, the equilibrium view
does not bar judicial consideration of an executive branch interpretation of a law, particularly insofar as the executive may enjoy expertise
that might clarify legislative meaning. But unlike instrumental theory,
the equilibrium model carries clear implications for the relative
weight due to substantive canons of interpretation—like the nondelegation canon—as compared with claims of executive deference. Contemporary writings on whether the executive’s view or a judicial canon
should trump in cases of statutory ambiguity commonly see the canons as flowing from some combination of functional interests in
judicial prudence, institutional minimalism, and administrative utili251

Farina, supra note 17, at 497 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 349 (James
Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)).
252
See id. at 487 (“[T]he Court’s vision of separation of powers evolved . . . to the
more flexible . . . proposition that power may be transferred so long as it will be adequately controlled.”).
253
Id. at 497-98.
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254

ty. And if nondelegation canons are driven principally by functional
concerns, then competing functional demands might trump the canons themselves—for example, the demand of deferring to executive
255
If, however, nondelegation
expertise in foreign relations matters.
canons are a necessary adjunct to the formal judicial power to interpret the law, then one might expect the Court to require at least a clear
statement before it interprets a statute or treaty to effect the transfer
256
An equilibrium
or accretion of significant discretionary power.
theory approach would embrace the latter view. That is, when faced
with ambiguity, the Court would give priority to interpretive canons
that reduce the likelihood that any one branch would be barred from,
or could shirk, continued participation in interbranch debate. To extend the example from above, a court considering the scope of detention authority provided by the 2001 AUMF would adhere to the substantive canon against delegation before simply deferring to executive
257
views on grounds of expertise.
Second, when a purely instrumental understanding of the judicial
power seems an inadequate and therefore unlikely explanation for
the Court’s active role in treaty interpretation, equilibrium theory
254

See, e.g., Kenneth A. Bamberger, Normative Canons in the Review of Administrative
Policymaking, 118 YALE L.J. 64, 76 (2008) (“[S]hould statutory ambiguity be resolved by
courts applying normative canons, as it was previous to Chevron? Or are these the kind
of normative questions that should . . . be assigned to agency judgment?”); see also, e.g.,
Sunstein, supra note 230, at 315-16 (arguing that to the extent nondelegation doctrine
remains of constitutional salience, it is enforced through the deployment of the interpretive canons). As noted previously, such canons have also been explained as a reasonable outgrowth of the faithful agent view of judicial power. See Edward J. DeBartolo
Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Const. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988)
(“‘[T]he elementary rule is that every reasonable construction must be resorted to, in
order to save a statute from unconstitutionality.’ This approach not only reflects the
prudential concern that constitutional issues not be needlessly confronted, but also
recognizes that Congress, like this Court, is bound by and swears an oath to uphold the
Constitution. The courts will therefore not lightly assume that Congress intended to
infringe constitutionally protected liberties or usurp power constitutionally forbidden
it.” (quoting Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 657 (1895))).
255
See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 23, at 2102-06 (arguing that the Supreme
Court has “made clear that delegation concerns are less significant when statutes concern foreign affairs than when they concern domestic affairs”).
256
See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 473 (2001) (“The very
choice of which portion of the power to exercise—that is to say, the prescription of the
standard that Congress had omitted—would itself be an exercise of the forbidden legislative authority. Whether the statute delegates legislative power is a question for the
courts, and an agency’s voluntary self-denial has no bearing upon the answer.”).
257
Note that Bradley and Goldsmith reach the opposite conclusion on the relevance of the nondelegation canon to AUMF interpretation. See Bradley & Goldsmith,
supra note 23, at 2102-06.
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would provide more meaningful guidance—leading the Court to disfavor constructions that disrupt interbranch equilibrium or otherwise
enable the accretion of federal power through international law. In
this respect the Medellín Court, for example, might be understood to
have acted appropriately to reinforce equilibrium by rejecting the executive’s argument that the ICJ’s judgment, although not binding in
courts of its own authority, “became the law of the land with precisely
that effect pursuant to the President’s Memorandum and his power
‘to establish binding rules of decision that preempt contrary state
258
Recall that the executive’s argument in Medellín was that the
law.’”
relevant treaties should be read to “implicitly” give the President the
power to implement the United States’ “treaty-based obligation” to ef259
Rejecting the executive’s
fect compliance with the ICJ’s decision.
proposed reading, the Court demanded a clearer statement—in the
treaty or, perhaps more sensibly, from Congress itself—that this was
indeed the desired effect. Absent such a statement, the Court would
not permit the executive to claim a power, by treaty, to “convert[] a
260
non-self-executing treaty into a self-executing one.”
Equilibrium theory could also counter trends in international law
and legal structures that may tend to increase the relative power of
261
domestic executives within domestic legal structures. Here, the
262
Court’s per curiam decision in Munaf v. Geren should stand as a cautionary tale. In Munaf, the Court was reluctant to “second-guess” the
executive’s determination, based on close coordination between the
U.S. State Department and the Iraqi Ministry of Justice, of the likelihood that two U.S. citizens would face torture if transferred to Iraqi
263
The executive argued that such second-guessing “would
custody.
require federal courts to pass judgment on foreign justice systems and
undermine the Government’s ability to speak with one voice in this
258

Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 523 (2008) (quoting Brief for United States
as Amicus Curiae, supra note 5, at 5); see also supra subsection I.A.1 (discussing Medellín and related cases).
259
Medellín, 552 U.S. at 525 (quoting Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 5, at 11) (emphasis omitted).
260
Id.
261
See, e.g., Martin S. Flaherty, Globalization and Executive Power 28 (Apr. 4,
2008) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (“[G]lobalization generally has
resulted in a net gain in power not for judiciaries, but for the “political” branches—
and above all for executives—within domestic legal systems.”); Scheppele, supra note
30, at 3-5 (describing how national executives have used a series of UN Security Council antiterrorism resolutions to expand executive power domestically).
262
553 U.S. 674 (2008); see also supra subsection I.A.2 (discussing Munaf).
263
Munaf, 553 U.S. at 702.
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264

area.” While the Court ultimately declined to reach directly the statutory and treaty interpretation questions that underpinned the ha265
beas petitioners’ request for relief, a view that it is part of the judicial duty to promote interbranch equilibrium would likely require the
Court to take a more active interpretive role.
B. Considering Formal Objections
As noted above, a view of the judicial power that affords the Court
a formal role in promoting interbranch equilibrium would tend to
trump the functional considerations of expertise on which most theo266
ries of executive deference are based. For this reason, the most powerful arguments against an equilibrium theory of judicial power in
foreign relations law are based not on the executive’s functional expertise, but rather on formal claims about its Article II power. Article
II offers the executive several fonts of authority, including the Commander-in-Chief Clause and the Treaty Clause, that may afford the
President interpretive power in foreign relations matters that is not
267
otherwise implicated in standard administrative law. Yet while there
is a good case to be made that the executive must have some inherent
power to interpret statutes and treaties, it is far from clear that this
power entitles the President to any more deference than federal agen268
Because an equilibrium theory undercies enjoy under Skidmore.
standing of judicial power poses no bar to the consideration of executive branch interpretations to this extent, recognizing some formal
interpretive power in the executive may be broadly compatible with
the judicial role described here.
Scholars have regularly argued that judicial deference to executive
interpretations of foreign relations–related statutes and treaties is necessitated in part by the President’s own formal constitutional authori264

Id.
See id. (finding that habeas petitioners had not successfully raised the claims in
the lower courts). Petitioners had argued that transfer would violate their rights under
a federal statute and treaty prohibiting the “return” of someone to another state when
there is a substantial likelihood he will be tortured. Id. (citing Foreign Affairs Reform
and Restructuring Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 2242(a), 112 Stat. 2681-822, and
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, supra note 120).
266
See Pearlstein, supra note 174, at 1572 (arguing that while functional considerations may be relevant in separation-of-powers disputes, clear formal constraints
remain important).
267
U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 1–3.
268
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
265
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ty. In the statutory context, for example, Professors Bradley and
Goldsmith have maintained that the executive should have fairly
broad power to construe its “necessary and appropriate” authority under the 2001 AUMF, a statute that, as noted above, is now the subject
269
In addition to suggesting various reasons
of much judicial debate.
that the executive might be entitled to judicial deference, Bradley and
Goldsmith contend that the executive’s formal constitutional authority over foreign relations renders interpretive canons disfavoring broad
270
delegations of power less salient. Citing cases such as Loving v. United States, in which the Court upheld the President’s authority under
the UCMJ to prescribe aggravating factors for death penalty sentencing in courts-martial, the authors posit that “‘[t]he delegated duty . . . is interlinked with duties already assigned to the President by express terms of the Constitution, and the same limitations on
delegation do not apply where the entity exercising the delegated authority itself possesses independent authority over the subject mat271
ter.’” Further, and more to the point, the authors contend, because
the nondelegation doctrine is itself less of a concern, so too should be
the nondelegation interpretive canon requiring a clear statement before
assuming Congress intended to authorize a broad delegation of pow272
Thus, while a statute delegating general power to the President
er.
to take certain action whenever it is “necessary and appropriate” might
ordinarily pose delegation concerns, in this view such delegation concerns in the foreign relations context neither render the statute invalid
nor even require that Congress clarify its intention before a court may
273
interpret the statute’s scope as broadly as the executive demands.
One need not reject entirely the belief that the President has
some formal authority to interpret and apply statutes to identify several reasons to doubt the ultimate persuasiveness of this claim. For one,
the Court’s reluctance to embrace nondelegation-doctrine challenges
to executive actions pursuant to statutory authority may be less significant to the scope of formal executive authority in foreign relations
than Bradley and Goldsmith assume. The modern Court’s lack of receptivity to substantive nondelegation challenges is hardly limited to
269

See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 23, at 2084 & n.150 (suggesting, inter alia,
that the executive might be entitled to Chevron deference).
270
Id. at 2100-06.
271
Id. at 2100-01 (emphasis added) (quoting Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748,
772 (1996)).
272
Id. at 2103-04.
273
Id.
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the foreign relations context. As the Loving Court noted, “Though in
1935 we struck down two delegations for lack of an intelligible principle, we have since upheld, without exception, delegations under
274
While cases such as Loving
standards phrased in sweeping terms.”
and Curtiss-Wright may have once seemed notable and foreign relations–specific exceptions to an otherwise broadly applicable rule
against recognizing broad delegations of legislative power, it should by
now seem clearer that these cases are only a few examples of a far
broader rejection of nondelegation challenges, entirely independent
of questions of formal executive power in foreign relations.
Beyond this, in many of the cases Bradley and Goldsmith cite in
support of their claim that the courts recognize that the executive’s
formal powers in foreign relations may flip standard canons of statutory interpretation, the Court has focused on the executive’s relative
functional superiority, not its formal authority. The 1965 passport275
regulation dispute, Zemel v. Rusk, is a case in point. There, the
Court was called to consider a nondelegation challenge to a statute
authorizing the Secretary of State to issue passports under rules prescribed by the President; the Secretary had interpreted the statute to
276
authorize the restriction of travel to Cuba. Paying modest attention
(by Chevron standards) to the executive’s views—noting only that
“[t]he interpretation expressly placed on a statute by those charged
277
with its administration must be given weight” —the Court rejected
the nondelegation challenge. Notably, its rejection was not couched
in language evincing any concern for (or recognition of) some inherent formal authority of the executive but rather on the grounds that
because of the changeable and explosive nature of contemporary international relations, and the fact that the Executive is immediately privy to
information which cannot be swiftly presented to, evaluated by, and
acted upon by the legislature, Congress—in giving the Executive authority over matters of foreign affairs—must of necessity paint with a brush
278
broader than that it customarily wields in domestic areas.

274

Loving, 517 U.S. at 771 (citing A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,
295 U.S. 495 (1935), and Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935)); see also
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 327-29 (1936) (upholding the
President’s delegated authority to impose an arms embargo).
275
381 U.S. 1 (1965).
276
Id. at 4.
277
Id. at 11.
278
Id. at 17.
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While there can be no question that the Court has taken such
functional considerations into account in construing statutory delegations of power to the executive and in resolving separation-of-powers
questions more broadly, a recognition that such considerations may
matter is a far cry from the position that the Court is compelled to
279
take them into account by the executive’s authority under Article II.
Perhaps more importantly, it is a significant—and unwarranted—
conceptual leap to move from the (arguable) proposition that delegation doctrine is broadly less salient when construing foreign relations
280
statutes to the proposition that the interpretive canon against broad
delegations should not apply, or the even broader proposition that
279

The other cases in the “passport trilogy,” relied on heavily by Bradley and
Goldsmith, are likewise unhelpful in advancing the claim that the President’s independent constitutional authority has some particular bearing on the Court’s role in
interpreting foreign relations statutes. In Kent v. Dulles, the Court held that statutes
providing that passports may be issued under “such rules as President
shall . . . prescribe” did not afford the executive the authority it claimed—namely, the
power to deny passports to citizens who appeared to support the Communist Party.
357 U.S. 116, 123, 129 (1958); see also Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 23, at 2101
(noting that the Kent Court declined to address whether a different analysis would be
appropriate if the case had arisen during a war emergency). To the extent one might
discern anything about what difference wartime (and therefore “war powers”) might
have made in the Court’s reasoning, it was a difference regarding the treatment of individual rights, not the relative scope of Congress’s power to delegate authority or the
executive’s power to exercise it. See Kent, 357 U.S. at 128 (distinguishing the instant
case from the Court’s wartime holding in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214
(1944), on the grounds that “[n]o such showing of extremity, no such showing of joint
action by the Chief Executive and the Congress to curtail a constitutional right of the
citizen has been made here”). In contrast, in Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 306 (1981),
the Court did uphold the President’s delegated authority to revoke a passport on the
ground that the holder’s activities abroad were causing serious harm to U.S. foreign
policy. But there, the Court squarely foreclosed the possibility that its delegation analysis was based on an assessment of the President’s Article II powers. See Haig, 453 U.S.
at 289 n.17 (“[W]e have no occasion in this case to determine the scope of ‘the very
delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal
government in the field of international relations—a power which does not require as
a basis for its exercise an act of Congress, but which, of course, like every other governmental power, must be exercised in subordination to the applicable provisions of
the Constitution.’” (quoting United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304,
320 (1936))). Rather, the Court’s decision was based on a finding that Congress was
aware of and, by taking no action over time, implicitly authorized a consistent executive branch practice of denying passports on such grounds. Haig, 453 U.S. at 302-03.
280
Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748 (1996), the key case Bradley and Goldsmith
cite for this proposition, did not purport to establish a principle of delegation in foreign relations law in general. Rather, the case was narrowly limited to the Court’s understanding of the Commander-in-Chief function as including the particular responsibility to take “action to superintend the military . . . ‘a specialized community governed
by a separate discipline from that of the civilian.’” Id. at 772-73 (quoting Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 94 (1953)).
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the Court’s role in interpretation may be appropriately ceded to the
executive in this realm. Indeed, even as the substantive nondelegation doctrine has shriveled in importance in the modern administrative state, the Court has paid sustained attention to the nondelegation
281
That the Court should prefer the interpretive
interpretive canon.
canon as an approach to serving nondelegation interests in fact makes
good sense. The substantive doctrine and interpretive canon serve
different purposes and have different effects. A holding that Congress
violates the separation of powers in overbroad delegations of authority
to the President conclusively limits the government’s options. The interpretive canon allows Congress and the President the opportunity to
pursue an arrangement of broadly delegated powers, but only if the
effect of the arrangement is made clear through democratic deliberation and clear legislative commitment. Although the Court has largely
declined to attach strong constitutional prohibitions to delegatedpower arrangements, that does not mean it has lost interest in pursuing separation-of-powers goals through less constitutionally “nuclear” means. Any reluctance the Court feels in applying the substantive doctrine in the foreign relations context may not—and need
not—carry over to its application of the interpretive canon.
Given the limitations of such doctrinal arguments, the stronger
claim that formal executive power may preclude adherence to equilibrium theory in the interpretation of statutes and treaties may come
by extension from the departmentalists, who maintain that the executive has at least some interpretive authority over the meaning of the
282
Recall that departmentalism holds that “each
constitutional law.
branch, or department, of government has an equal authority to interpret the Constitution in the context of conducting its duties” and “is
283
supreme within its own interpretive sphere.” Based on textual, struc284
tural, and historical claims to shared interpretive authority, as well as
on various strands of political theory including notions of popular con285
stitutionalism, the general idea may be succinctly summarized:

281

See Sunstein, supra note 230, at 315-16 (arguing that nondelegation doctrine is
“alive and well” in the form of substantive interpretive canons against delegation).
282
See sources cited supra note 230.
283
Whittington, supra note 247, at 782-83.
284
See generally Paulsen, supra note 248 (surveying such arguments in favor of the
President’s interpretive authority).
285
KRAMER, supra note 248, at 31 (noting that communities once had a “credible
interpretive voice when it came to the constitution”).
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Just as, under Marbury v. Madison, the obligation to decide cases consistently with the Constitution gives the Court the power and obligation of
judicial review, so, too, the Constitution’s grant of executive power, together with the duty faithfully to execute the laws, means that the executive and Congress acting in their own spheres must interpret and apply the
286
Constitution.

While it is certainly true that aspects of the departmentalist rationale are strongly tied to the unique task of constitutional interpreta287
tion and therefore are not necessarily instructive on the question of
statutory and treaty interpretation at issue here, not all of the textbased arguments for departmentalism are limited to the interpreta288
Indeed, departmentalist reliance on the
tion of the Constitution.
separation-of-powers idea that the power of interpretation is too important to be held exclusively by one branch cannot obviously be li289
mited to constitutional interpretation per se. It thus should not be
surprising that some departmentalist scholars have suggested that their
view of the executive’s formal interpretive authority extends to statutes
290
291
and treaties as well. The “judicial power,” a term understood to en286

Pillard, supra note 248, at 687 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
Some departmentalists have pointed to the presidential oath of office, for example, as a textual basis for understanding the President as having some independent
constitutional responsibility to explain (in service of upholding) the Constitution.
That Clause imposes upon the President the duty to “preserve, protect and defend the
Constitution of the United States,” not the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United
States. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 (emphasis added); see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 266-67 (3d ed. 2000) (recognizing the importance of the
Oath Clause in the departmentalist argument). Other scholars have likewise made arguments grounded in political theory that are tied specifically to the task of constitutional interpretation. See, e.g., KRAMER, supra note 248, at 106-10 (discussing how the
three branches of government should reach compromise when their interpretations
differ); TUSHNET, supra note 248, at 6-32 (raising various arguments against judicial
supremacy in constitutional interpretation).
288
While the Oath Clause may make executive interpretive authority over the
Constitution of special significance, the Take Care Clause makes no such textual distinction between different sources of federal law. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (“[H]e
shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed . . . .”).
289
See Paulsen, supra note 248, at 222 (“The framers believed that liberty is best
preserved where governmental power is diffused . . . .”).
290
See, e.g., id. at 221 (“The Supreme Court’s interpretations of treaties, federal
statutes, or the Constitution do not bind the President any more than the President’s
or Congress’s interpretations bind the courts.”); see also Dawn E. Johnsen, Functional
Departmentalism and Nonjudicial Interpretation: Who Determines Constitutional Meaning?,
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 2004, at 105, 113 (“[A]ll three branches share the
responsibility to uphold the Constitution.”).
291
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law
and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under their Authority . . . .”).
287
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compass an interpretive function, extends equally to the Constitution,
statutes and treaties. Why would the “executive power,” if understood
to encompass any interpretive function, be construed differently?
A weak version of the claim that the executive has some independent authority to interpret statutes and treaties is not especially objectionable. The executive must have at least some power to interpret
the law, if only enough to “take care” that the law is implemented in
292
the (frequent) absence of a controlling judicial opinion.
Whether
the courts fail to resolve all interpretive questions because of structur293
294
al limitations or because of more prudential concerns, it is clear
that not all statutes and treaties needing enforcement will be subject
to judicial construction. Indeed, this view seems unassailable in formal terms, as one might readily imagine the constitutional requirement for the executive to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed
includes the power to do what is practically necessary to execute the
laws, including determining the law’s meaning. At the same time, this
kind of interpretive authority does not generally threaten the “judicial
power,” a power limited by the express recognition that the federal
courts will decide only those disputes concrete enough to constitute a
295
case or controversy. Accepting that the executive has some interpretive power of this sort does not imply an answer to the question of
whether this power in foreign relations matters should preclude the
Supreme Court from exercising a duty to apply its own interpretive
power to preserve interbranch equilibrium.
292

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; see also, e.g., W. Michael Reisman, Necessary and Proper:
Executive Competence to Interpret Treaties, 15 YALE J. INT’L L. 316, 325-28 (1990) (arguing
that the executive must inevitably make judgments about what the law requires); Eugene V. Rostow, The Reinterpretation Debate and Constitutional Law, 137 U. PA. L. REV.
1451, 1455 (1989) (“[T]he President necessarily interprets and reinterprets every statute and treaty . . . .”).
293
See U.S. CONST. art. III (establishing the structure and jurisdiction of the federal courts).
294
Walter Dellinger and H. Jefferson Powell give an example of this concern:
In 1800, Congressman Marshall explained to the House of Representatives
that the Constitution does not vest in the federal courts the exclusive authority
to decide issues arising under the Constitution, laws and treaties; while such
issues are by definition questions of law, some of them are “questions of political law,” and must be answered by one (or both) of the political branches of
the government.”
Walter Dellinger & H. Jefferson Powell, Marshall’s Questions, 2 GREEN BAG 2D 367, 367
(1999) (quoting the Honorable John Marshall, Speech on the Resolutions of the Honorable Edward Livingston, Delivered in the House of Representatives (Mar. 7, 1800), in 4
THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL 82, 103 (Charles T. Cullen & Leslie Tobias eds., 1984)).
295
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
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A stronger version of the departmentalist idea, however, challenges not only judicial exclusivity in interpretation, but also judicial
supremacy: the assumption that the Court necessarily wins the interpretive battle of the branches. In this view, where a particular power
is textually committed to the executive alone, such as the power to issue pardons or veto legislation, the executive should enjoy supremacy
296
in determining how to interpret these powers. Some departmentalists contend that the President must thus have the authority to decline
297
to enforce statutes he believes are unconstitutional. An even broader view suggests that the President’s interpretive authority entitles him
298
to refuse to comply with orders of the courts.
While such claims
299
remain a minority view, it is not difficult to imagine the implications
of such a view for statutory and treaty interpretation: if the executive
can fully ignore laws he thinks tread on a matter within his exclusive
constitutional power, then his interpretation of those laws should have
some primacy even if only to avoid such a dramatic step. Indeed, it is
precisely this argument that John Yoo, among others, has advanced
with respect to treaty interpretation—specifically, that the Constitution grants the President exclusive control over treaty interpretation by
vesting the executive power in the President and by granting the Pres300
ident power to make treaties.

296

See WHITTINGTON, supra note 205, at 14 (describing a theory of “fixed departmentalism” that holds that “‘allocation of interpretive authority varies by topic or constitutional provision’” (quoting Scott E. Gant, Judicial Supremacy and Nonjudicial Interpretation of the Constitution, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 359, 384 (1997))).
297
See Johnsen, supra note 290, at 112 (noting that a few departmentalists argue
that the President should choose not to enforce laws if he finds them “constitutionally
objectionable”).
298
See Paulsen, supra note 248, at 222 (arguing that the President “may refuse to
execute (or, where directed specifically to him, refuse to obey) judicial decrees that he
concludes are contrary to law”).
299
See, e.g., Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional
Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1362 (1997) (challenging the idea that the
courts’ interpretations of the Constitution do not bind nonjudicial authorities).
300
See John Yoo, Politics as Law?: The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the Separation of
Powers, and Treaty Interpretation, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 851, 869-70 (2001) (book review)
(contending that the Constitution imparts full control over treaty interpretation to the
President). Although Yoo’s position is set forth in the context of treaty interpretation
specifically, his textual reading of Article II’s Vesting Clause would appear to have implications for statutory interpretation as well. See also Bradley, supra note 11, at 699
(arguing that because the executive has broad constitutional authority of its own with
regard to foreign affairs law, there should be little concern that shared authority—even
shared interpretive authority—runs afoul of formal constitutional limits).
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301

Yoo’s account is plagued by several flaws, not the least of which
is that it is difficult or impossible to establish which, if any, of the executive’s foreign relations powers are exclusive. The executive’s pow302
er to make treaties is coupled with the Senate’s power to ratify them.
The Constitution equally defines the “judicial Power” as extending to
“all Cases . . . arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United
303
States, and Treaties made.” And the courts certainly have a long history of behaving as though treaty interpretation is a power shared with
304
With respect to the Commander-in-Chief powthe judicial branch.
er—arguably the most relevant formal duty “interlinked with” the statutory power contained in the AUMF—scholars have recently shown,
in exhaustive detail, that Congress has historically been “an active participant in setting the terms of battle (and the conduct and organization of the armed forces . . .),” an assertion of shared power that the
305
executive has most often accepted as within Congress’s authority.
Departmentalism may give the executive strong claims to formal interpretive authority where it is clear his is the only source of constitutional power, but wherever power is shared, as in the realm of foreign
relations, the task of maintaining equilibrium seems relevant.

301

For example, Martin Flaherty highlights the historical deficiencies of Yoo’s
argument:
[T]he framers were virtually of one mind when it came to giving treaties the
status of law. . . . The imperative need to make treaties legally binding on both
the states and their citizens was widely recognized by 1787. The major consequence of this perception was the ready adoption of the supremacy clause,
which gave treaties the status of law and made them judicially enforceable
through the federal courts.
Martin S. Flaherty, Response, History Right?: Historical Scholarship, Original Understanding, and Treaties as “Supreme Law of the Land,” 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2095, 2120 (1999)
(quoting Jack N. Rakove, Solving a Constitutional Puzzle: The Treatymaking Clause as a
Case Study, 1 PERSP. AM. HIST. 233, 264 (1984)); see also Derek Jinks & David Sloss, Is the
President Bound by the Geneva Conventions?, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 97, 194-95 (2004) (noting that Yoo’s contention that treaty interpretation is solely within the executive realm
is flawed, as the Constitution distributes power among all three branches); Michael P.
Van Alstine, The Judicial Power and Treaty Delegation, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1263, 1276-77
(2002) (arguing, inter alia, that in light of the Framers’ understanding of the separation of powers, committing the power to “make” treaties to the executive would preclude vesting the power to interpret them in the same branch).
302
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (“He shall have Power . . . to make Treaties, provided
two thirds of the Senators present concur . . . .”).
303
Id. art. III, § 2 (emphasis added).
304
See supra subsection I.A.1 (reviewing treaty-interpretation cases).
305
David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest
Ebb—A Constitutional History, 121 HARV. L. REV. 941, 947 (2008).
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CONCLUSION
In many respects, the tendency of scholars and courts to view treaties and foreign relations statutes as a separate species of law is unfortunate. While it may have once been possible to draw a bright line between the tasks of governing that were purely domestic and those that
arose uniquely in the realm of foreign relations, transformations in
areas from international trade and communications to biology and
warfare to international law and legal structures render the easy distinction between foreign and domestic power increasingly quaint.
The Supreme Court’s active engagement with resolving foreign relations–related legal disputes in recent years may be seen as one manifestation of this broader trend. At the same time, considering foreign
relations as a quasi-distinct body of law may continue to offer heuristic
benefits. Among these benefits is the opportunity to evaluate dominant models of the judicial power against a particular set of examples
that these models were not necessarily conceived to address. This Article has suggested that one lesson of this evaluation is to require the
development of some additional understanding of the role of the
courts in law interpretation.
Beyond such theoretical considerations, the question this Article
addresses is one of intense practical concern over a novel question
faced by contemporary courts: in construing a statute authorizing the
President to use “necessary and appropriate force” to battle international terrorism, whose view of the meaning of “necessary and appropriate” controls? By arguing for an equilibrium-promoting concept of
judicial power, the intent here has not been to discount the many reasons why the courts may wish to, and should, attend closely to the executive’s views. The executive’s functional strengths—its access to bodies of experts across the U.S. government and its experience in both
applying the law on the ground day-to-day and applying its understanding of its own duties and political demands—make its views indisputably worth consideration. Rather, the point of this Article is to
argue that it is possible for the courts to take such insights into account without pretermitting their own interpretive exercise in categorical deference to any position the executive might take. Indeed,
this Article has contended that such categorical deference is not formally required (as a matter of executive power) and may be formally
prohibited (as a matter of judicial power).
Given the practical concerns driving this inquiry, it is fair, in the
end, to wonder whether such a conclusion—effectively leaving the
courts to determine the extent to which the executive’s interpretation
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has “the power to persuade”—is bound to leave the courts more confused and less constrained than they already are. It is an intriguing
question for empirical study. But the outcome is far from obvious.
The courts are consistently in the business of conducting multifactor
analyses in the style of Skidmore to determine whether a search was reasonable, whether a defendant was afforded all process due, and a host
of other inquiries. The Skidmore factors that contribute to persuasiveness are themselves a finite set. And in the end, the most meaningful
constraints on the judicial power are most likely to come from the
same powers that hold the executive and Congress in check: the dynamic and ongoing struggle among the branches.

